Iraq Study Group

Bush’s 80th option?

Asian Tribune Dec 23, 2006

US President George Bush would be disheartened by the prognosis and recommendations of the Iraq Study Group (ISG). The report prepared by a team headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Democrat Congressman Lee Hamilton came to the conclusion that was privately aired in the US for months: that the situation in Iraq is rapidly deteriorating, the current policy of the Bush administration could not be sustained and that a major course correction is overdue.

While not being dramatic, the ISG did not mince words. It rejected the theme song of the Bush administration that the US was ‘winning in Iraq.’ On the contrary, "the ability of the US to influence events in Iraq is diminishing." It depicted the situation in Iraq to be grave saddled with sectarian warfare, growing violence and "a slide toward chaos." Because the ‘violence is increasing in scope and lethality’ the ‘stay on course’ is not an option for the US.

Sixty-one out of 79 Recommendations of the ISG pertains to domestic Iraqi situations and the measures that were to be taken by the Iraqi government headed by Nouri al-Maliki and highlights three prime tasks before the Iraqi government that periodically figures in the Report: national reconciliation, security and governance.

While highlighting a number of specific tasks before the Iraqi people, the Report admits that continuing violence could lead to "greater chaos… a collapse of the Iraqi government" and splitting of the “country along sectarian lines." Unless arrested quickly, the country could slide into a catastrophe.

Yet the Report was blunt and unequivocal: if Iraqi government fails to deliver substantial progress, then the US "should reduce its political, military or economic support for the Iraqi government." Short of major crisis, it also set early 2008 as the possible date for the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq. The absence of open-ended presence, the ISG hoped would induce the Iraqi government to take much needed measures to ensure its principal goals of reconciliation and security.

Bush’s real headaches come in the foreign policy recommendations of the ISG. If the US could unilaterally invade Iraq, the Report concluded that any resolution of the mess would demand the cooperation of the international community and the immediate formation of the Iraq International Support Group that would comprise of all those countries and players who have a stake in a stable and united Iraq.

The Report had also had repudiated, debunked and overwrote some of the popular notions and policies of the Bush administration regarding Iraq. A number of critical components of the Iraq policy went by the way side and they include:

• No remapping of Iraq but the country would stay united;

• No territorial division of Iraq;

• No regime change in Iran and Syria;

• Any resolution of the Iraqi crisis would also mean resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, a linkage that the US had rejected when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990;

• The so called axis of evil, Iran has a positive role to play in Iraq;

• Direct American diplomatic engagement of Iran and Syria; and

• US has no intension of controlling the Iraqi oil

Indeed with the sole and notable exception of the al-Qaeda elements, the Report advises the President to engage with all the players both inside and outside Iraq. In its assessment the US "can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try and resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests."

The members of the ISG however, do not have any illusion that their report even if implements would be that ‘magic formula’ that could turn around the situation in Iraq. In its views, the recommendations as "the best strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region."

Had such recommendations been made by an individual, group or institution, the Administration could dismiss them as partisan. The bipartisan nature of the ISG makes thinks difficult for the President. The Group was also equally categorical: no cherry picking of the 79 recommendations. It sees the Iraq crisis a part of the larger crisis in American foreign policy as well as turbulence in the Middle East and hence views its recommendations as comprehensive and holistic. More or less the bipartisan group has taken a take-it-or-leave approach.

Given his growing unpopularity highlighted by the biannual congressional elections in November, the President will have no stomach to reject the Recommendations. Since the Baker-Hamilton report has rejected some of their pet theories, the neo-cons would surely retaliate and come with an alternative course of actions. Given the harsh ground realities, it is extremely unlikely that they could come with friendly option that also viable.

Having pursued a unilateral policy on Iraq, it would not be easy for President Bush to make a u-turn and prepared to adopt the recommendations of the ISG and start courting Iran and Syria. Much of the external recommendations go against some of the basic foreign policy formulations of the Bush Administrations.

Even if they were implemented there are no guarantees for success. For example constructive engagement with Iran and Syria, as recommended by the ISG not mean that they could bring down sectarian violence in Iraq.

Thus, instead of looking at the Baker-Hamilton recommendations, President Bush might consider the 80th option. Accept that his Iraqi policy was a failure and unpopular. The drastic situation in Iraq needs a dramatic solution. Short a reversal, Bush will not be able to satisfy the ISG. While he and his team might be pushed by a messianic zeal, the Middle East, especially Iraq is not ready for democracy. Even the ISG does not claim that their recommendations are a recipe for success.

Thus, in stead of courting all-and-sundry, President Bush might consider handing over Iraq to Saddam Hussein. So long as the latter agrees to protect sensitive American interests in the Middle East and elsewhere, Bush could afford to live with his nemesis returning to the presidential palace in Baghdad. What happens then?

P R Kumaraswamy the writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Web link:http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/3802