Iran: Nuclear row

The dilemma of a nuclear Iran

Commentary for ISN Security Watch (10/05/06)

Ideally, Iran's reported success in enriching a small quantity of uranium should enable it to climb down from its rhetoric and seek a negotiated settlement with the international community over its nuclear ambitions. Having exhibited its defiance against western, especially US pressure, the mullahs could now prepare the Iranian public for the kind of compromises and compliances demanded by the UN Security Council.

As the room for a diplomatic solution shrinks, it is inevitable that the world will have to consider the prospect that Iran will continue with the enrichment process and eventually weaponize its nuclear program, if that has not already been at least partially accomplished. While the timeframe of such an achievement remains contested, a nuclear Iran appears to be a real possibility, whether it becomes such overtly or covertly.

Tracing Iran's nuclear ambitions

Iran’s nuclear ambition can be traced primarily to its troubled relations with the US. So long as US recognition remains elusive, Iran cannot regain its "legitimate" place in the comity of relations. Instead of recognizing Iran’s regional power status, the US is seeking a regime change in Tehran. As such, the nuclear path appears an attractive preposition for both warding off those attempts and securing Washington’s recognition.

Tehran’s ability to throttle any possible military action by the US is based on the latter viewing Iran as a nuclear or near-nuclear power. A rudimentary bomb or the perception of such a capability offers Iran reasonable insurance, if not a guarantee, against US military intervention.
In other words, if the prospect of Iran going nuclear increases the chances of US military action, the possibility of President George W. Bush taking such a recourse increases the chances of Iran opting for weaponization.

There is, however, one minor consolation. Unlike North Korea, Iran is not an international outcast. Despite the setbacks in the early years of the Islamic revolution, Tehran has gradually mended its ties with its regional neighbors as well as with the outside world. Until the election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran had maintained good relations with most countries, except the US and Israel. The prospect of Iran going nuclear would definitely undermine the "normalcy" that prevails between Iran and the rest of the world.

Iran could no longer count on the support of Russia and China, which have slowly moved away from their earlier positions. A nuclear Iran would complicate their long-term strategic interests in the Middle East as well as their non-proliferation policies. A host of Iranian actions, including test-firing of nuclear-capable missiles and defiant actions over enrichment had placed even Iran's erstwhile friends, Russia and China, in a quandary.

Weaponization would undoubtedly enhance domestic support for the conservative establishment and would perhaps provide some diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis the West. Yet, its Arab neighbors would view such a course as a signal for perpetual Iranian domination of the Middle East and thereby undermine Iran’s interests in its immediate region. Nuclear Iran would thus ensure Persian hegemony as well as its regional isolation.

The international community's options

The North Korean model of "constructive engagement", whereby Moscow would play a key role in persuading Tehran to sit down at the negotiating table, would be one of the options before the international community. Unlike Beijing vis-à-vis Pyongyang, Moscow’s influence vis-à-vis Tehran is rather limited and Russia is unlikely to deliver Iran. Having learned a harsh lesson from the six-party talks with North Korea, the US would be weary of a similar venture in the Middle East, where the stakes are much higher, especially when such a course would potentially be opposed by many of Iran's Arab and non-Arab neighbors.

Another option would be the South African model, whereby political incentives and recognition would be used to lure Iran to abandon its nuclear path. While the end of the apartheid regime facilitated the transition of South Africa into a non-nuclear weapons power, Iran is still reeling under the conservative mullahs.

A third option would be the Israeli model of the West gradually recognizing Iran as a nuclear power and coming to terms with the reality. Unlike Israel, Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and hence, accepting a nuclear Iran would induce other NPT-member states, especially in the Middle East, to tread similar paths. Moreover, so long as the clergy retains its stranglehold over the state, such an option would be politically unacceptable, not only in the West but also in the Middle East. Iran would have to present itself as a stable, responsible, and pragmatic player and not a regional nuclear hegemon.

Ironically, demands of regime change partly fuelled Iran's nuclear ambitions, but changing the current leadership would be essential if Iran were to have any chance of being recognized as a nuclear power. Therein lies the dilemma: Iran could neither be dissuaded from the nuclear path nor could the world be made ready to accept a nuclear Iran ruled by the mullahs.

Web Link:

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=15778