ISG Report and Iran Syria

Engaging the Adversaries: Easier said than done

Among the 79 recommendations suggested by the Iraq Study Group (ISG), one stands out loud and clear: the US should engage with its adversaries not just friends. Or in its words “a nation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflict and differences consistent with its own interests.” In the present context of Iraq, this would mean negotiating with Iran and Syria. This would be necessary, the Report suggests because, “Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively.”

Unfortunately however, this is easier said than done.

First and foremost, this would imply that President Bush abandoning his six-year rhetoric against both these countries. In his State of the Union address in 2002, he called Iran part of the axis of evil. While Syria did not formally earn this dubious distinction, the Bush administration resolutely kept itself from Damascus and sees it as a hindrance to its interests and policies in the Middle East. The support provided to Islamic militant groups like Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah are often used to reject any meaningful role for Damascus. Its refusal to recognize the Lebanese independence as demanded by UN Security Council resolution 1680 did not help matters either.

Iran is a different kettle of fish. Since the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the hostage crisis, both countries have not come to terms with one another. The historic baggage was too heavy for either of them to adopt a meaningful non-emotional attitude about the other. The nuclear controversy surrounding Iran and the periodic outbursts of Iranian President Ahmadinejad have only made matters worse. At least in the foreseeable future, a substantial dialogue let alone reconciliation looks remote.

However, according to the authors of the ISG, both these states have an interest in the unity and stability of their Arab neighbour and could play a constructive role in bringing about an improvement in the Iraqi situation.

The former argument is rather easy to understand. Further chaos and eventual disintegration of Iraq would not serve the interest of any of Iraq’s neighbours including Iran and Syria. While both countries would like to enjoy a role for themselves or even meddle in favour of one or other groups within that country, balkanization of Iraq is a different matter. Any division of that Arab country along sectarian lines would have far reaching consequences for Iran and Syria as well. In recent months Iran has troubles with its Arab minorities while ruling establishment in Syria is controlled by the Alawi minority.

The report prepared by a team headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Democrat Congressman Lee Hamilton went on to claim: ‘Iran’s interest would not be served by a failure of US policy in Iraq.” It is essential to recognize that notwithstanding the anti-American rhetoric in public, since the 1990s Iran had immensely benefited from the American policy in the Middle East. The reversal of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, prolonged sanctions against Baghdad, the regime change in the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and finally the removal of Saddam Hussein from power were Iranian dreams but made possible by the policies of the ‘Great Satan.’

Likewise, Iranian officials gloat in private that thanks to Uncle Sam, now there is a Shia crescent in the region stretching from Bahrain in the Gulf to Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Thanks to Bush’s democratization now the marginalized Shia majority is power in Iraq.

Moreover, the Report maintains that the US has a series of ‘disincentives and incentives’ to influence the Iraqi policies of Iran and Syria. Though true, there are no guarantees that even if both countries were eager to ‘help’ the US, their ability to play a constructive role is rather questionable. At best they could reduce their support to some of the groups within Iraq but such a passive role is unlike to make any difference. While it is always easier to meddle in the affairs of other countries, brining about stability would require far reaching capability, influence and political power. Short of an outright occupation, neither Syria nor Iran is likely to bring about the change visualized by the ISG report.

Critics of the Report highlight Baker’s past role in legitimizing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Beginning with his desire to waive an anti-Saddam grand coalition following the Kuwait crisis of 1990 and the post-war Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, the then Secretary of State was more than accommodating towards President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria. In return for Syrian willingness to join the anti-Saddam war front and peace talks with Israel, the US recognised and some might argue even legitimised the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

Things have changes since then. Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, independence from Syrian presence and control has become a prime issue in Lebanese politics. Hence, there are fears in the region accommodation with Syria would come at the cost of Lebanon and its fragile independence.

In short, far from resolving the Iraqi quagmire, engagement with Iran and Syria would create new problems for President Bush than visualized by the Baker-Hamilton Report.