India: Kuwait

Re-energising the gulf bilaterals
P.R. Kumaraswamy
Indian Express (New Delhi) Tuesday, June 13, 2006

When Shaikh Sabha al-Ahamd al-Jaber al-Sabah arrives in India on Wednesday for a six-day state visit, he would be marking a new phase in Indo-Kuwaiti relationship. The brewing troubles over Iran and the resultant tensions in the Persian Gulf would figure prominently during his visit. India has significantly moved away from its erstwhile opposition to the presence of non-regional powers in the Gulf region and can now understand the security dilemmas of smaller states like Kuwait. In private deliberations with Indian leaders, the Kuwait delegation can be expected to be more candid about their apprehensions over a nuclear Iran.

But the visit will also be a milestone in the bilateral relations and signals an end to the long rupture between the two countries, following the Iraqi invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. Given that a large number of Indian workers were stranded in Kuwait in that period, none would have complained if India were to tread a delicate path.

Furthermore, there were strong political, economic and even ideological reasons that prevented India from actively criticising the Iraqi invasion. The Baathist ideology of Iraq attracted the Indian nationalists. In the post-Nasser era, they found the Iraqi leaders more in tune with their brand of secularism. This also explains why India refused to condemn Iraq for its aggression against and prolonged war with Iran in the 1980s. Indeed, until the 1990s Iraq remained India’s closest friend in the Middle East and its relations with Tehran during this period could be described as ‘correct’ rather than close.

But the government headed by V.P. Singh went overboard. Egged on by a powerful segment of the intelligentsia, India gave the impressions that it was siding with Baghdad over the blatant aggression. Indeed a bus stop near the Kuwaiti embassy in New Delhi was quietly renamed ‘Railway Museum Stop’.

Not just the government, even the mainstream intelligentsia sided with Iraq over Kuwait. Seminars organised by think-tanks propagated views that went to the extent of questioning the legitimacy of Kuwait as an independent state. Driven by ideological blindness and politically correct anti-American rhetoric, many harped on the imperial hand in the formation of Kuwait. Disregarding the issues of national aspirations of the Kuwaitis, they tacitly endorsed Saddam Hussein’s claim of Kuwait being the 17th province of Iraq. As a result, less than two weeks after the Iraqi invasion, then foreign minister, I.K. Gujral, became the first foreign leader to meet Saddam Hussein.

Even hours before the commencement of Operation Desert Storm on 17 January 1991, Indian diplomats based in the Middle East were predicting “peaceful” resolution. Meanwhile the government changed and Chandra Shekar, who became the prime minister, subsequently sought to minimise the damage by providing logistical support to American planes that were operating from Diego Garcia.

But the damage to Indo-Kuwait relations was substantial. Besides strong historic connections until 1961, the Indian rupee was the legal currency in Kuwait. Many Kuwaitis felt let down by the Indian refusal to stand up against a blatant aggression. India became a fair weather friend, who could not be counted on in times of crisis.

The widely publicised Gujral-Saddam hug cost India dearly. According to former foreign secretary, J.N. Dixit, not just Kuwait but many Arab countries did not forget the incident easily. Indeed when he return to government in the late 1990s, none of the Gulf countries invited Gujral.

New Delhi’s traditional focus on Palestinians in dealing with the Middle Eastern countries did not work with Kuwait. During the occupation the Palestinian leadership, especially Yasser Arafat, sided with Saddam Hussein. This dented the Palestinian-Kuwaiti relations beyond repair. Indeed, despite repeated American pressures, Kuwait refused to host Arafat until his death in Novemer in 2004.

India’s policy towards the Middle East since the Kuwait war underwent significant changes. It has gradually moved away from Iraq, forged closer ties with Iran and sought to minimise the role of Pakistan in cultivating countries such as Saudi Arabia. With its accelerating economic growth, much of India’s policy toward the Gulf countries has been focussed on energy needs. Qatar and Oman have emerged principal players in India’s long-term energy plans.

But normalisation of relations with Kuwait remained a slow and painful process. Since the visit of then foreign minister, Madavsinh Solanki, in February 1992, India has been trying to mend fences with the Gulf sheikhdom. Even though media reports then were not very favorable, as Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s envoy he opened the door for a dialogue. The effort has been bi-partisan when leader of opposition, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Kuwait in October 1997 and numerous officials exchanged visits.

Though long-term cooperation in energy security would dominate the bilateral agenda, the visit of Emir al-Sabah would be primarily a climax of that reconciliation. As Kuwait’s foreign minister during the 1990-91 crisis it would not have been easy for him to see his Indian counterpart hugging the aggressor. Hopefully both sides have learnt from the past. Therein lies the importance of al-Sabah’s visit.

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