India: Hezbollah

India sidesteps the thorny issue of Hezbollah


Exclusive to Asian Tribune, August 8, 2006

On 31 July the Lok Sabha passed an unanimous resolution expressing India’s sentiments and concerns vis-à-vis the ongoing violence in the Middle East. Reflecting the traditional Indian position towards the region, it expressed its concern over the violence and condemnation of Israel.

This 246-worded resolution, however, has diluted India’s earlier stand on the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. A day after the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers, which precipitated the current conflict, New Delhi was more categorical. Even though it was critical of Israel’s “excessive and disproportionate military retaliation” against the Lebanese infrastructure, it was equally critical of the Lebanese militants. Without explicitly naming Hezbollah, the official statement categorically declared: “India condemns the abduction of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006 by Lebanese militants and calls for their immediate release.”

It is undeniable that the conflict has brought about colossal human tragedy and destruction of infrastructure. The resolution pointed out the conflict has “resulted in the killing and suffering of large number of innocent civilians, including women and children, and caused widespread damage to civilian infrastructure.”

The Indian lawmakers however, pretended that these sufferings are confined only to Lebanon. By focusing exclusively on the Lebanese dimension of the problem, the resolution gives a wrong and misleading impression that the destruction and casualties are one-sided.

Since the conflict began, Hezbollah has been directly targeting residential areas and its leader Hassan Nasrallah has been periodically threatening to strike at Tel Aviv. Besides the Ministry of Defence, the greater Tel Aviv area does not have any target of military significance. The barrage of rockets from Lebanon had forced more than quarter of a million Israelis to leave their homes in the north and to seek refuge in the central and southern Israel.

The partisan nature of the resolution becomes exposed when the House “conveys the deepest condolences, sympathy and support of the people of India to the people of Lebanon at this difficult time.” This is a reminiscent of the past when the India did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. While sympathy for the people of Lebanon is legitimate, fair and honourable, the resolution makes it a zero-sum game.

In the long run such blatantly one-sided wording would severely undermine India’s role and influence in the Middle East. Any post-ceasefire peace agreement would require the support and understanding of all parties to the conflict. By adopting an explicitly anti-Israeli position the Lok Sabha has undermined India’s role in any UN peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon, especially if the unarmed UN observers were replaced or strengthened by a robust force.

Likewise, the Lok Sabha was not prepared to explicitly recognise and accept Israel’s concerns but rather preferred to settle for generalities. According the lawmakers, “lasting peace and security in the region” would have to take “into account the legitimate interests and grievances of all the parties concerned.” Was it too sensitive to mention Israel’s concerns explicitly? But why?

One could attribute a number of possible explanations for the shift in India’s position from the early days of the conflict and its anti-Israeli tenure of the Lok Sabha resolution. There is a gradual shift in the position of the Arab states vis-à-vis the crisis. Even states such as Saudi Arabia who earlier were critical of the ‘misadventure’ of the Hezbollah have modified their positions. Partly due to domestic public opinion in support of the Hezbollah and partly due to Israel’s massive retaliation, the mainstream Arab states find it difficult to condemn the Shia militants in Lebanon when that country is under siege. India’s shift is also a reflection of this trend.

Two, the government of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh survives on the outside support of the Left parties. Of late, these parties who are both part of the government and part of the opposition, have been wielding considerable influence on India’s foreign policy. Since the outbreak of the recent violence in the Middle East, the Left parties have renewed their anti-Israeli antics. While remaining silent on the Hezbollah angle, these parties have been demanding the government to immediately suspend all military deals with Israel.

As the fighting went into its second week, Communist Party of India (Marxist) General Secretary Prakash Karat demanded that India should work for the imposition of international sanctions against Israel. Within days as many as 86 MPs belonging to various parties made a similar demand. With the Indo-US nuclear deal coming under widespread criticisms from the Left and Right, Prime Minister Singh could not afford open a new front over Lebanon.

Three, as the fighting intensified a number many were critical Israel for its excessive use of force. For the Indian politicians it was politically correct to maintain a studied silence on the role of Hezbollah in the entire drama. Even the Bharatiya Janata Party known for its pro-Israeli views thought it prudent the follow the general consensus in the Lok Sabha.

Four, India has rarely appreciated the internal nuances of various countries in the Middle East, especially Lebanon. Used to the conventional binary portrayal of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is unfamiliar with the confessional and complex politics of Lebanon.

Furthermore, its traditional understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also coloured India’s views vis-à-vis Lebanon. For many in India there are not much difference between Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. Both are perceived as forces that are ‘resisting’ the Israel occupation. The larger problem of Hezbollah undermining the authority of the central government in Beirut and thereby the stability of Lebanon, is rarely understood in India. Many Indian intellectuals are ignorant of the Syrian non-recognition of Lebanese independence and sovereignty. Hence, Indian leaders are not an exception in not appreciating the nuances of Lebanon and the inherent differences between Hamas and Hezbollah. If India supports the former, the logic goes; it should also support the latter, because both are fighting Israel.

Above all, Indian leaders have rarely appreciated the dilemma faced by others in combating terrorism and other forms of political violence. The Israeli experience of fighting fire-with-fire may not be replicated in other parts of the world. Likewise, other states could not be expected to follow the Indian practice of negotiating with groups that kidnap its citizens (from the Rubaiya Sayeed episode in December 1989 to the Kandahar hijacking in December 1999) Such a strategy might work in India but there are no guarantees that it would be effective in other parts of the world.

Thus, when the violence eventually stops in the Middle East, Indian leaders and political parties would have to learn a think or two about the delicate art of diplomacy.

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