India: UNIFIL

Lop-sided on Lebanon
P.R. Kumaraswamy
Indian Express (New Delhi) 2 September 2006

While other countries are preparing to increase their contribution, it is likely that India will pull out from the UN peacekeeping force that is currently operating in southern Lebanon. The recent remarks of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s special envoy to the Middle East, Chinmaya Gharekhan are a giveaway: “We are not going to disarm Hezbollah. We are not going to fight the Lebanese people.”

According to him, India would not send a peacekeeping force to Lebanon until the UN decides the rules of engagement. Likewise, he told his interlocutors in Beirut that India “does not want to resort to force while dealing with the Lebanese people, resistance, army or anyone else”. India would not be party to any disarming of the Hezbollah, one of the principal elements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

The Security Council was acutely aware that another crisis in Lebanon could be prevented only by reining in the Hezbollah from adopting parallel foreign policies that are independent of the central authority in Beirut. It demanded that “there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon”.

To enable the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon, the Security Council sought to increase the strength of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to 15,000 from its current strength of less than 2000. Besides this, it also authorised the UN forces “to ensure that its areas of operation are not utilised for hostile activities of any kind”. The UN force was to “assist” the Lebanese army “to exercise its authority throughout the country”. This would mean the new UNIFIL will not be monitoring the ceasefire; it will be enforcing peace in southern Lebanon.

It was this enhanced and unchartered mandate that had resulted in many European countries, including France to reconsider their earlier enthusiasm. While resolving the crisis serves the interests of all parties, these countries are afraid of being caught in the Israel-Hezbollah crossfire.

The UN peacekeepers have often became victims of Israeli strikes against the Hezbollah. Furthermore, the UN resolution also calls for an embargo of arms and ammunitions to Hezbollah from Lebanon’s neighbours — Syria and Iran, two key backers of Hezbollah. The new UN force will have to perform functions of a peace enforcer and this in turn places India in a quandary.

Days after the adoption of Resolution 1701, the Foreign Office ruled out the prospects of India sending additional troops. But the recent utterances of Gharekhan raise doubts about the continued Indian participation. The recent crisis has altered the mandate of the UNIFIL and India would not be able to pretend that its contingents would be ‘observing’, not ensuring’, peace along the Israel-Lebanese border. Either India recognises the new ground realities and adjusts its policy or it pulls out of the UN operations in Lebanon.

At one level, since independence India sees its participation in peace keeping missions both as a sign of its commitment to international peace as well as an international vindication of its impartiality. In recent years peacekeeping is also viewed as a ‘great power’ responsibility. Hence, any Indian pullout of Lebanon would severely undermine its aspirations to play an important role in crisis situations.

The indecisiveness over the UNIFIL, also underscore the aged old dilemmas facing India’s Middle East policy.

The unanimous resolution adopted by the Lok Sabha signalled India’s partisan view of the events in the region. While criticising Israeli attacks against Lebanon and its civilian population, the Indian lawmakers were silent on the death and destruction wrought by Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel.

Narrow domestic calculations, constant pressures from the ideological Left, ideological blindness, partisan politic, lopsided Indian understanding of the complex Lebanese reality and pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian sentiments among sections of establishment have resulted in India not being willing to admit the threats posed by radical militant groups such as Hezbollah. Like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hezbollah operates within a sovereign state and pursues an independent and autonomous foreign and security policy that are at odds with the central authority. India’s Special Envoy to the Middle East might believe that Hezbollah is a resistance force and that the Lebanese nation should not be made accountable for the activities of Hezbollah. Then not many will believe Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when he blames President Parvez Musharraf for the actions of LeT.

The writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi