Israel: Sharon
Understanding the Sharon Phenomenon
PINR 19 DECEMBER 2005
With the Knesset elections just three months away, Israel is experiencing unique political change. Events during the past few weeks suddenly transformed its ideology-driven political culture into a personality-oriented presidential model. While pre-election loyalty switching is normal in closely contested elections, Israel is in the midst of a major shift toward a personality cult.
Not a day passes without some of the other Israeli leaders rediscovering their old loyalties and pledging support to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his newly formed Kadima Party. The defections come primarily from the Right and more particularly from the Likud Party from which Sharon had bolted recently.
Rebellion by a small group of ministers and senior party figures led by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu compelled Sharon to leave the party. Ever since Sharon took over the reins following the defeat of the Likud in the 1999 elections, he had galvanized the party and secured successive victories in the 2001 and 2003 elections, a feat no Likud leader managed to accomplish after Menachem Begin's victory in 1981.
Why Kadima?
The reasons behind Sharon leaving the party he loved and built since the late 1970s has to be traced to the Gaza disengagement plan that was completed in August 2005. Though the pullout was widely popular, it evoked strong opposition from within the rank and file of the party. Many right-wing Israelis, both within and outside Likud, feared that the dismantling of all the Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and four isolated ones in the northern West Bank would be a beginning of an eventual Israeli pullout from much of the occupied territories.
They put up stiff resistance within the Likud and in the cabinet; many Likud members in the Knesset openly opposed the Sharon plan. During the past few months, the Likud leader had to lean on the Labor Party to ensure the smooth functioning of the government.
Despite all the protests by settlers before live cameras, Sharon stood his ground and successfully took Israel out of the Gaza Strip. Ironic as it might appear, for the first time since the departure of the British in 1948, the Palestinians in the Strip largely have control of their destiny.
Internal divisions within the party did not disappear after the departure of the last Israeli soldier from Gaza. Sharon's efforts to expand the cabinet were throttled by a handful of Likud MKs who voted against the move in the Knesset.
Meanwhile, with the completion of the pullout and the election of a new leader, the Labor Party was quick to end its cohabitation arrangement with Sharon. Thus, it was obvious that Sharon no longer enjoyed the buffer that prevented a complete onslaught from the Likud rebels.
Moreover, the election of the Moroccan-born trade union leader Amir Peretz as the new leader of the Labor Party complicated the position of Sharon. Peretz was quite different from Shimon Peres whom he narrowly defeated for the party leadership. Representing the Sephardim community (Jews who had emigrated from Arab and Middle Eastern countries), he could undercut the traditional support base of the Likud. For long, this section of Israelis felt neglected and alienated by the Ashkenazi-dominated Labor party.
Peretz was also showing signs of greater accommodation with the Palestinians and a desire to hasten the stalled peace process. Given his stint as the leader of the powerful Histadrut labor federation, he is no pushover and could present himself as a real alternative to the Right.
In other words, at one level, Sharon was facing a formidable challenge from the new Labor leadership; at another level, he was facing rebellion within his own party. It was obvious that even if he managed to win the next election originally slated for late 2006, his space to maneuver would shrink further.
Indeed, given the proportional representation system of elections in Israel, no single political party had ever secured a simple majority in the 120-member Knesset. Therefore, instead of being held prisoner by his own party, Sharon opted to bolt out and float his own party, named Kadima.
Initial Exodus
Party splits are not unprecedented in Israel's history. For example, along with his close allies Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres, in 1965 former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion left the erstwhile Mapai (later Labor Party) and floated Rafi. Its electoral impact was limited and a few years later it re-joined the Labor Party. Similarly, Likud also faced defections.
The public response to Sharon's move has been exceptional. When he left the party, Sharon took with him 13 other MKs, the minimum number required to escape from the provisions of anti-defection laws. Among others, the former mayor of Jerusalem and current Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert threw his lot with Sharon.
A few days later, leading figures like Tzachi Hanegbi and Shaul Mofaz joined the Sharon camp. Hanegbi was the acting chairman of the Likud and hence a powerful figure within the party Central Committee. Until the other day, Mofaz was a contender for the post-Sharon Likud leadership. A number of local leaders are also slowly switching their loyalties.
For many party members, Sharon personified the Likud. They blame the Likud rebels for dragging the party too far to the right and thereby forcing Sharon to leave. In their view, efforts by extremist leaders such as Moshe Feiglin would result in the marginalization of the party and would diminish the differences between the Likud and other far right groups such as the National Union.
However, the defection has not been confined to the Right alone. In recent weeks, Sharon is reinventing himself as a new David Ben-Gurion who played a pivotal role in the embellishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and led the country during the crucial years afterwards. This is working wonders for Sharon among left-wing Israelis.
Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who lost the leadership race to Peretz, threw his weight behind Sharon. The prime minister also secured the support of former Labor ministers such as Haim Ramon and Dalia Itzik. Even though the support base of these figures is rather limited, their move reflects the growing support in favor of Sharon.
Indeed, one could expect more defections from the Labor Party in the coming weeks. Already, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak criticized the new Labor leader for not preventing the departure of Shimon Peres. Partly because of this, he refused to run for the party primaries that would select the Knesset list.
There are growing fears that the former trade union leader would crowd the Labor Party list with his friends and supporters and thereby push established Labor figures to the unrealistic slots in the list. Therefore, after the Labor primaries, many might find Kadima an attractive proposition.
Even traditional left-wing parties such as Meretz-Yahad had expressed a willingness to work with Sharon after the election. In the past, leaders such as Yossi Beilin have been highly critical of Sharon and have held him responsible for much of the violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Indeed, while the Left was clamoring for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it was the hard-line Sharon who promised and ensured Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. This irony would not go unnoticed among seasoned observers.
Even the religious segment is not immune from the ground realities. Sharon's move is causing concern among the religious electorates who have traditionally been sympathetic toward the Right, especially since the Likud victory in 1977. Sharon's charisma and his erstwhile support for the religious voters during his tenure as the Housing Minister work in his favor. In the absence of powerful figures, religious parties such as Degel Hatorah and Shas will likely face erosion in their support base.
The position of the influential Arab community, however, is unclear. Sharon enjoys considerable support among the Bedouins and a section of the Likud members from this community had already defected to Kadima. However, the support of the larger Arab community which constitutes about a sixth of the Israeli population would be crucial if Sharon were to complete the circle. It would be safe to assume that Sharon would enlist the services of Peres and Ramon, who in the past were active among the Arab votes, toward this objective.
Conclusion
A week can bring radical change in Israeli politics. Anything might happen between now and March 28, 2006, when the Knesset elections occur. Current predictions of a landslide victory for Sharon might prove premature.
First and foremost, age is not in favor of Sharon who is in his late 70s. Since Kadima is merely his own party, he would be both its mascot and prime campaigner. Though a small country, electioneering is a grueling experience in Israel. The news that Sharon suffered a mild stroke on December 18, 2005 highlights Sharon's vulnerability. Moreover, even if he were successful, Kadima has the danger of becoming a one-time party.
There are a number of legal cases pending against a few of Sharon's close associates, including his son Omri. A swift change of loyalties might be personally rewarding but has the danger of becoming politically unpopular. While the public endorses Sharon's determination to leave Likud and float his own party, they might not take the same view of others who desert the sinking ship.
Moreover, many Israelis view Peres as an electoral liability. In his long political career, he had never won any elections or led the party to victory. His support might do some harm to Sharon, especially among his anti-Oslo followers.
Going by the current opinion polls, Kadima is expected to emerge as the single largest party and thereby ensure Sharon's continuation as prime minister. Even if this does not materialize, it is abundantly clear that by deciding to leave an established party and form a new political outfit at this late stage in his life, Sharon has taken a significant political risk.
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posted by P R Kumaraswamy at 5:16 AM
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