Iran: Arab Fears

Arabs under a Persian moon
P.R. Kumaraswamy
Indian Express (New Delhi) : Monday, April 24, 2006

The current tension over the nuclear ambitions of Iran is causing great concern among its Arab neighbours. While they are individually too weak to express their apprehensions over a nuclear Iran, collectively they are not in a position to organise themselves effectively against such a possibility.

Excessive focus on Iran, especially its nuclear potential, runs counter to immediate Arab interests. Such a posture would put them at variance with the Arab street, which is sympathetic to Iran. In recent months, debate over Iran’s suspected nuclear ambitions has largely been presented as an American agenda against an Islamic country. Hence, publicly highlighting the dangers of a nuclear Iran would position Arab rulers as US henchmen against Tehran.

Moreover, having lived under Israel’s widely recognised nuclear potential, the Arab states could not possibly air their opposition to Iran taking a similar recourse. Given the scarce support base of many Arab regimes, such a posture would be suicidal.

Yet, the Arab regimes are not enamoured by Iran’s growing military muscle. Its enhanced missile capability is bound to cause tension and anxiety among its Arab neighbours. Its Shahab-3 missiles have a range of about 1,300 km and Iranian officials have publicly claimed they are developing a new variant of the Shahab, with an extended range of 2,000 km.

The Arabs also are not comfortable with Iran’s regional ambitions. Its growing military might comes against the background of unresolved or renewed disputes between Iran and the wider Arab world. Iran is yet to normalise relations with Egypt and the portrait of President Anwar Sadat’s assassin still hangs in a prominent street of Tehran.

Of late, the traditional Arab-Persian rivalry over the nomenclature of the Gulf has resurfaced with the custom officials in Iran reportedly refusing entry of products from Gulf countries which carry the phrase “Arabian Gulf”.

The recurring demands for retaining the “Arab character” of Iraq should be seen as a tactic to warn against Iranian “meddling” in Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have openly expressed their concerns over any Iranian role in the Iraq crisis. Earlier this month, in a development marked by unprecedented candidness, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak warned: “Definitely Iran has influence on Shiites. Shiites are 65 per cent of the Iraqis... Most of the Shiites are loyal to Iran, and not to the countries they are living in.”

The prolonged dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway that separates Iran and Iraq is still not resolved and the arrest of Iraqi sailors has fuelled fears of Iranian expansionism. Tehran still occupies three islands also claimed by the UAE.

Immediately after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there were tensions over the publication of a cartoon in a Bahrain daily, which was seen to be offensive to the Shias. The Shias of Bahrain have often taken to the streets against the Sunni-dominated ruling dynasty. Private talk by Iranian diplomats of a “Shia crescent” — from Bahrain to Bekaa Valley in Lebanon — does not go down well with the Sunni-majority Arabs of the Middle East.

Latent Arab concerns vis-a-vis nuclear Iran came into the open during the February vote at the IAEA. Iran’s only regional ally, Syria, joined hands with other maverick states like Cuba and Venezuela and supported Tehran. The two other Arab members of the Agency, Egypt and Yemen, quietly voted with the majority that went against Iran.

The erosion of support for Iran in the international community was also a contributing factor. Even countries like Russia and China which have greater political and economic stakes in Iran would not be able to ignore their larger stakes in the Arab world, especially Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh’s recent high profile contacts with countries like India, China and Japan should also be seen in this context. While these countries offer new avenues for Saudi investment, King Abdullah is also saying Iran is not the only long-term strategic partner for Asia, especially in the energy sector.

It was their apprehension over the ambitions of the revolutionaries in Tehran that prompted many neighbouring Arab states to support Saddam Hussein during the prolonged Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Domestic fervour against the US and their inherent military weaknesses inhibit the Arab countries from adopting a sufficiently forceful stand against a possible nuclear Iran.
Neither individually nor collectively are they in a position to articulate their positions. At the same, absence of strong public postures should not be seen as an Arab willingness to live under Persian hegemony, with or without nuclear weapons.

Web Link: http://www.indianexpress.com/story/3058.html

Israel: Kadima

Kadima’s dilemma: what next?
P.R. Kumaraswamy
Indian Express Wednesday, April 12, 2006 at 0000 hrs IST

The good showing of the Kadima (Forward) in the recent Israeli elections raises more questions than answers. At one level, the party formed only a few months ago managed to maintain its unity despite founder Ariel Sharon’s absence from the political scene. With 29 seats it emerged as the largest party in the 120-member Knesset and the main contender to form the next government. The electoral victory of Kadima, however, was a far cry from the 44 seats that were originally projected at the height of Sharon’s popularity before his stroke in December.

This less than impressive victory of Kadima comes against the background of the near total decimation of the Likud, its parent party. With just 12 seats, the Likud has suffered its worst electoral defeat since 1951 and is relegated to the fourth position in the Knesset. Perhaps it is just a matter of time before Benjamin Netanyahu is forced out of its leadership. While the Labour Party headed by former trade union leader Amir Peretz galvanised the social agenda in the election campaign, it was unable to convert this into electoral assets. With 19 seats, the party merely managed to retain its strength in the outgoing Knesset. But considering the defection of some key Labour figures, such as former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, to Kadima, this was no mean achievement.

Despite a not-too-impressive showing, Peretz toyed with the idea of putting together an alternative coalition with the support of right-wing parties. When this did not go well with his voters he backed down to join hands with Olmert to form the next government. The performance of Yisrael Bitenu, headed by Avigdor Liberman, a former Netanyahu aide, and the Pensioners Party have startled many observers. With 12 seats, the former emerged on a par with the Likud and a strong contender for Olmert’s coalition. The Yisrael Bitenu, which enjoys the support and backing of the Russian immigrants, is today vital for the stability of the government. In the past, Sharon often visited Russia. This was partly to earn the trust and support of Russian voters. But the inclusion of Liberman in the government has its problems. He had been virulently hostile to Israel’s Arab citizens and has often been accused of racism by his detractors. His participation in the government would therefore be a negative signal to Israel’s minority population which remains politically marginalised. Moreover, this would also perpetuate the exclusion of Arab and communist parties from the Israeli government. The Arab parties — despite having won 10 seats — are unlikely to be a part of the new government.

The victory of the newly-formed Pensioners Party underscored the social agenda of the Israeli voter. The economic policies, especially those carried out by Netanyahu when he was finance minister, pushed a large segment of the Israeli population below the poverty line. For a long while even the Labour Party abandoned its social welfare character and allowed the ethno-religious Shas party to emerge as the torch-bearer of the welfare agenda. To this day, the Shas party has the support of the development towns and weaker sections. Likewise, the Pensioners Party has managed to attract the support of a wider segment of the population, and emerged as a key player.

Based on past experience, Olmert would be looking to shape a broad coalition that would include the Labour, Pensioners, the religious parties and some right-wing parties. Indeed, with the exception of the Likud and Arab parties, all the others appear to be potential partners in government. A broad-based coalition becomes inevitable if Olmert wants to resolve some of the painful issues confronting Israel today. However, on the critical issue of the peace process the verdict is anything but clear. Some Israeli commentators have viewed the election results as a vote against Olmert’s plan to replicate Sharon’s disengagement plan and carry out similar unilateral Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank. While some of the potential coalition partners are opposed to any Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, most are clearly opposed to any unilateral measures. Olmert fought the election by publicly declaring his desire to pursue the unilateral option. This unilateralism, however, has not gone down well with voters. Lacking the strong personality of Sharon, Olmert will not be able to pursue his option seriously.

The day Israel went to the polls, a new Palestinian government headed by the Ismail Haniyeh took over. If the unilateral option is not there, could it be that the electorate was ordering Olmert to seek a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians, now headed by Hamas?

The writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University.Write to kumaraswamy.pr@gmail.com