Wednesday, October 25, 2006

India: New Foreign Minister

Mukherjee as Foreign Minister: Political Heavy Weight to political wilderness?
Exclusive to Asian Tribune October 25, 2006
After nearly a year, India at last got a Foreign Minister in the form of veteran Congress leader Pranab Kumar Mukherjee. It would have taken considerable persuasion on the part of Congress President Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to make Defence Minister agreeing to move to the External Affair Ministry.
His reluctance was both natural and inevitable. Like many other countries in the world, foreign policy has never been a major agenda in India. The foreign policy debates have been dominated by a small but vocal segment of intelligentsia, most of them based in the capital. The rest of the teaming millions are oblivious of the developments in far off lands. Naturally, professional politicians, especially those with larger ambitions, rarely envisage any interest in the foreign office.
Thus, since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru the Foreign Ministry is not considered a coveted position in the cabinet. During every cabinet formation, the tussle has always been for powerful ministries like Home, Finance and Defence. It is not accidental that most Prime Ministers also functioned as India's Foreign Ministers. Even when senior cabinet colleagues looked after the Ministry, sensitive issues pertaining to foreign policy has always been the prerogative of the Prime Ministers.
In moving Mukherjee to this position, Manmohan Singh sought to achieve some coherence in foreign policy.
Advantages
Mukherjee looking after the Foreign Ministry would free Manmohan Singh from running the day-to-day affairs. Partly because of this problem, in recent months the Indian Prime Minister has become a frequent flyer. His periodic absence from India could be partly mitigated by the Mukherjee's new responsibility.
Two, since the UPA came to power in 2004, some of Singh’s cabinet colleagues were at odds with the Prime Minister’s worldview. His fondness for closer ties with Washington did not enjoy the unanimous support of the cabinet. The position of former Foreign Minister Natwar Singh and current Panchayat Raj Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar over the government’s policy towards Iran could be cited as an example. There is a widespread belief that Natwar Singh was even kept out of loop when India decided to vote against Iran at the IAEA. Likewise, with his diplomatic background, Aiyar even tried to run a parallel foreign policy to pursue his energy diplomacy.

There are no indications that such differences exist between the Prime Minister and his new Foreign Minister. The manner in which Mukherjee promoted closer cooperation with the Pentagon underscore that both share a common towards promoting the Indo-US ties.
Moreover as a political heavy weight, his cabinet colleagues would be weary of stepping on to his toes on foreign policy matter as happened during the tenure of Natwar Singh.
At the same time, Mukherjee’s reluctance to move to the South Block was also understandable.
Why the reluctance?
One, despite his long political career and diverse experience, Mukherjee's tenure at the foreign office has been rather brief. He was one of the three Foreign Ministers who served under Narasimha Rao when the foreign policy remained firmly under the control of the Prime Minister. That Manmohan Singh could function without a full-fledged foreign minister for over 11 months indicates that there was no urgency. While it was good that the country has a regular foreign minister, this status quo could have continued without much difficulty. This means that Mukherjee is taking over a Ministry, which was functioning without much difficulty. So long as the broad foreign policy guidelines are available, professional diplomats could run the ministry with little help or interference from the few junior ministers. In short, while they would be happy to have a cabinet minister, the foreign office could also function without one.
Two, the media hype over his appointment does not hide that there is little need or scope for innovation. Mukherjee would not be able make any difference to some of the principle issues that dominate the current Indian foreign policy agenda. On issues like closer ties with the US, need to engage with Pakistan or improve political relations there will not be any shifts. In some of these issues, the Defence Ministry could add substance to political understanding worked out by the Foreign Office. He would be carrying out the policies set in motion by the Prime Minister and pursued by the mandarins during the absence of a minister.
Three, as External Affairs Minister Mukherjee would have to undertake a lot of overseas travelling. In recent months due to the absence of the Foreign Minister, Mukherjee has emerged as a key interlocutor with the great powers including China and represented the country at the annual session of the UN General Assembly. This would only increase considerably. On the flip side, this would also mean he would have far less time for internal developments and nurturing his political constituency.
Since taking office earlier this month, the new Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon has more or less settled down. Those who were disappointed at his elevation have either left the service or were suitably accommodated elsewhere. Some of the key positions within the Ministry are either filled or in the process of being filled.
As a professional, he would not easily agree to party functionaries being posted abroad as diplomats. Some of the recent political appointees like Aneil Matherani, Natwar Singh’s choice for Croatia, only brought embarrassment. These would mean that there is little scope for Mukherjee to bring about any substantial changes at the organizational level.
Above all, the Foreign Ministry offers far less scope for political patronage, a must for all politicians. Like his predecessor Natwar Singh, Mukherjee might go for an advisory board saddled with his favourites and cronies. Beyond that, there is little scope for bestowing brownie points for loyalty. This in political terms would mean less scope for building and consolidating support base.
In short, a political heavy weight running a ministry that lack political power.
Demotion?
Seen in this overall context, it is possible to interpret Mukherjee’s shift as a demotion. As a seasoned troubleshooter, his hands are full with mired problems facing the government, party and ruling coalition. With his prime ministerial ambitions, he would have to take care of his support base in West Bengal.
Above all the Defence Ministry gave him considerable media coverage, scope for extensive domestic travel and financial clout with the industry. As the most conservative branch of the establishment, the Defence Ministry also shielded him from political controversies.

Mukherjee will soon miss all these at his new abode.

Tuesday, October 24, 2006

India: Egypt

Mubarak is busy, Please mail the Nehru award

Exclusive to Asian Tribune, Friday, 7 July 2006

The nadir of Indo-Egyptian ties can be gauged by the importance that the latter attaches to the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding conferred upon President Hosni Mubarak. Nearly a decade after the Indian decision, the Egyptian leader is yet to find time or inclination to make a trip to New Delhi and formally receive the award.
This Egyptian behaviour is in contrast to the attitude of others. Of late India has become a favourite destination for many world leaders. None could blame India if it lost count of heads of state and government who are making a beeline to New Delhi. During the last decade it hosted two sitting American Presidents, scores of western leaders and other heads of state. Even countries of the Middle East have also discovered its growing importance and in recent years, India had many visitors including King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, President Mohammed Khatami of Iran and the new Emir of Kuwait.
At times such crowded visits also have their flip side. Overshadowed by the visit of President George Bush, French President Jacques Chirac’s sojourn a few days earlier rarely made ripples in the Indian media.
Cold wind from Cairo
Yet Egyptian leader had no time for India. The attitude of the present Egyptian leadership reflects its changing priority towards India. On a few occasions, Indian diplomats in Cairo publicly declared that New Delhi was looking forward to the visit of President Mubarak but in vain.
In normal circumstances, this should not raise any eyebrows as countries formulate state visits depending upon their relative importance, diplomatic useful and economic potentials.
In case of Egypt however, there is a catch. With much fanfare and some diplomatic calculations on 24 July 1997, an eminent selection committee headed by the then Vice President K R Narayanan nominated Egyptian President Mubarak for the Jawaharlal Nehru award for the year 1995. Besides recognizing the contribution of the Egyptian leader to international peace, especially in the Middle East peace process, the honour was also meant to garner some diplomatic mileage.
Given the negative signals from Cairo over the Indo-Israeli normalization carried out in January 1992, New Delhi hoped that the Nehru award might partly mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities. Indeed, partly to pacify the Egyptian concerns and misgivings in early 1992 New Delhi even opened the Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo.
Ironically however, nearly a decade later the award is yet to be presented because Mubarak is too busy to visit India. One two occasions, his visit was planned only to be cancelled at the last minute. Once Indian President Narayanan was indisposed and on the second occasion, the ever turbulent Middle East prevented the Egyptian leader from making that trip. Hence, a decade later, Nehru award for 1995 is still languishing in New Delhi.
According to procedures, a seven-member jury headed by the Vice President selects the awardees, with the Chief Justice of India functioning as ex-officio member. Thus, since July 1997 when Mubarak was selected for the award, India had seen two new vice presidents and as many as nine new Chief Justices.
The miss appears deliberate. For over a decade Mubarak has skipped even multilateral meetings hosted by India. In 1993 for example, at the last moment he cancelled his participation in the much publicised G-15 summit of developing countries. Similar moves by others resulted in the summit being postponed to 1994 but Mubarak still failed to show up. Partly to express his displeasure, in May 1998 Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee skipped the G-15 summit this time hosted by Cairo.
Without mentioning Mubarak by name, in December 2002 the government told the Rajya Sabha, “The Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for the year 1995 was awarded in the year 1997. Despite concerted efforts having been made, the Awardee has not yet been able to come to India to receive the award.”
Proudly admitting the honor conferred upon its leader, the official cite of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry proudly maintains “India continuously renews the invitation to President Mubarak to … receive the prize.” But it offers no any explanation for the prolonged hesitation on the part of the Egyptian leader.
Time to change
By conferring awards named after leaders such as Nehru, India hopes to secure and promote its interests in foreign lands. Indeed, they play an important role in India’s cultural diplomacy. In it in this context one should view the efforts by the Indian foreign office to name principal streets and corners in different parts of the globe after Mahatma Gandhi.
Cultural diplomacy has often played an important role in India’s foreign relations, especially in the Middle East. With the aim of promoting Indian influence and culture artists, dancers, film stars and other cultural teams regularly visit the region and elsewhere. “Anthony” Bachchan still remains more popular in the Arab world than any other Indian icon, past or present.
Even if one were to ignore the absence of reciprocal gesture, the failure of Egypt to arrange Mubarak’s visit indicate the current status of the Indo-Egyptian ties. Even the highly publicised visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 was insufficient to instil a sense of urgency in Cairo’s diplomatic calculations vis-à-vis India.
The attitude of the present Egyptian leadership towards India is in total contrast to the hay days of the 1950s when Nehru’s friendship with Gamal Abdul Nasser dominated India’s Middle East policy. Cairo was for a constant fixture in Nehru’s periodic sojourns to Europe and both leaders met nearly a dozen times. Indeed, in its early days much of India’s Middle East policy was influenced by the Nehru-Nasser factor.
Things have changed and so is the Egyptian worldview. Likewise time has come for New Delhi to re-examine its cultural diplomacy. With the next announcement of Nehru award around the corner, India should evaluate the political importance that the awardees attach to such honours. If India does not take the memory of its venerable leaders more seriously, others will not.
Web link

Monday, October 16, 2006

Middle East Controversies

"The Middle East: Unbearable Status Quo versus Unpredictable Changes", Mediterranean Quarterly, vol 17, no.1, Winter 2006, pp.116-132

Full Text
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v017/17.1kumaraswamy.pdf

*
"Who am I: The identity crisis in the Middle East", MERIA, vol.10, no.1, March 2006

Full text
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a5.html

*

"Monica Lewinsky in Middle Eastern eyes", Middle East Quarterly, vol.6, no.1, March 1999
Full text
http://www.meforum.org/article/471

Minority Question

* "Problems of studying minorities in the Middle East", Alternatives, vol.2. no.2, summer 2003. Full text at
http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/kumar.htm

Monday, October 09, 2006

New Arrival: Dictionary

Scarecrow Press has just published my Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.
About the BOOK:
"Anyone seeking key facts on the Arab-Israeli conflict is going to find this an extraordinarily useful reference work."—Dr Anthony H Cordesman, The Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
"P.R. Kumaraswamy has taken on a Herculean but necessary task in trying to explain this key Middle Eastern issue fairly, systematically, and comprehensively in a single volume. The fact that he has succeeded in doing so will be valuable for both researchers and those who simply want to understand better the most complex and important region of the contemporary world."—Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs Center
From the blurb:
For over a century, the conflict between the Arabs and Jews has remained the most intractable problem confronting the world. Hardly a day passes that the Arab-Israeli Conflict is not headlined in the media. It has turned the Arabs and Israelis against one another, and also embittered relations within the two communities, while drawing the rest of the world into the circle of disruption.
The Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict provides factual background through a list of acronyms and abbreviations, an introductory essay, a chronology, a bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on the more significant persons, places and events, including the various wars and negotiations. The history, religion, culture, and archeology that this rivalry has sparked between the Arabs and Israelis over the same piece of territory is traced in this book, which offers the essential details using neutral terms and thereby allowing readers to draw conclusions for themselves.
You can find additional information at:

Sunday, October 01, 2006

MONOGRAPHS


Israel’s New Arch of Friendship: India, Russia and Turkey, (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, Research Papers, 2005), pp.46

The "Strategic partnership" between India and Iran, Special Report 120, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, (Washington, April 2004), (co-authored with Robert M Hathaway et al)
Web link


India-Israeli Relation: Humble Beginnings, a Bright Future, (Washington, DC: American Jewish Committee), 2002,

Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations, (Memorandum no.55), (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies), March 2000, pp.81.
Web link
www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo55.pdf

India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership, (Security and Policy Studies, No.40) (Ramat Gan: BESA Centre for Strategic Studies), September 1998, pp.62.
Web link
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/40pub.html

Political Legitimacy of the Minorities: Israeli Arabs and the 1996 Knesset Elections, (The Emirates Occasional Paper No. 20), (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies Research), 1998, pp.61.

Israel’s China Odyssey (Delhi Papers 2), (New Delhi: IDSA, 1994), pp. 95.

BOOKS

Israel and Islam, (London: Routledge) (forthcoming), (co-edited with Efraim Karsh)

Security Beyond Survival: Essays for K Subrahmanyam, edited, (New Delhi: Sage, 2004)

Israel, the Hashemites and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle, (co-edited with Efraim Karsh), (London: Frank Cass, 2003)

Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, (edited) London: Frank Cass, 2000)

China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence, (edited) New Delhi: Sage, 1999)

Israel-Pakistan Web Articles

Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations, (Memorandum no.55), (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies), March 2000, pp.81.
Web Link
www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo55.pdf]

“The strange parallel careers of Israel and Pakistan” Middle East Quarterly, (Philadelphia, PA), vol. 4, no. 2, June 1997, pp.31-39
Web link
http://www.meforum.org/article/348

Israel-China Relations Web Articles


“At what cost Israel-China Ties?”, Middle East Quarterly, vol.13, no.2, Spring 2006, pp.37-44.
Web Link
http://www.meforum.org/article/926]

Israel-India Relations Web articles

"India and Israel: Emerging partnership", Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.25, no.4, December 2002, pp.192-206
Full text
*
India-Israeli Relation: Humble Beginnings, a Bright Future, (Washington, DC: American Jewish Committee), 2002,
Web link
http://www.ajc.org/inthenews/publications.asp?did=521&pid.1220%20&%201219
*
India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership, (Security and Policy Studies, No.40) (Ramat Gan: BESA Centre for Strategic Studies), September 1998, pp.62.
Web Link
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/40pub.html
*

“Strategic Partnership between India and Israel”, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), (Electronic Journal) (Ramat Gan, Israel), vol. 2, no. 2, May 1998;
Web Link
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/1998/issue2/kumaraswamy.pdf