Sunday, December 24, 2006

ISG Report and Iran Syria

Engaging the Adversaries: Easier said than done

Among the 79 recommendations suggested by the Iraq Study Group (ISG), one stands out loud and clear: the US should engage with its adversaries not just friends. Or in its words “a nation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflict and differences consistent with its own interests.” In the present context of Iraq, this would mean negotiating with Iran and Syria. This would be necessary, the Report suggests because, “Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively.”

Unfortunately however, this is easier said than done.

First and foremost, this would imply that President Bush abandoning his six-year rhetoric against both these countries. In his State of the Union address in 2002, he called Iran part of the axis of evil. While Syria did not formally earn this dubious distinction, the Bush administration resolutely kept itself from Damascus and sees it as a hindrance to its interests and policies in the Middle East. The support provided to Islamic militant groups like Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah are often used to reject any meaningful role for Damascus. Its refusal to recognize the Lebanese independence as demanded by UN Security Council resolution 1680 did not help matters either.

Iran is a different kettle of fish. Since the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the hostage crisis, both countries have not come to terms with one another. The historic baggage was too heavy for either of them to adopt a meaningful non-emotional attitude about the other. The nuclear controversy surrounding Iran and the periodic outbursts of Iranian President Ahmadinejad have only made matters worse. At least in the foreseeable future, a substantial dialogue let alone reconciliation looks remote.

However, according to the authors of the ISG, both these states have an interest in the unity and stability of their Arab neighbour and could play a constructive role in bringing about an improvement in the Iraqi situation.

The former argument is rather easy to understand. Further chaos and eventual disintegration of Iraq would not serve the interest of any of Iraq’s neighbours including Iran and Syria. While both countries would like to enjoy a role for themselves or even meddle in favour of one or other groups within that country, balkanization of Iraq is a different matter. Any division of that Arab country along sectarian lines would have far reaching consequences for Iran and Syria as well. In recent months Iran has troubles with its Arab minorities while ruling establishment in Syria is controlled by the Alawi minority.

The report prepared by a team headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Democrat Congressman Lee Hamilton went on to claim: ‘Iran’s interest would not be served by a failure of US policy in Iraq.” It is essential to recognize that notwithstanding the anti-American rhetoric in public, since the 1990s Iran had immensely benefited from the American policy in the Middle East. The reversal of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, prolonged sanctions against Baghdad, the regime change in the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and finally the removal of Saddam Hussein from power were Iranian dreams but made possible by the policies of the ‘Great Satan.’

Likewise, Iranian officials gloat in private that thanks to Uncle Sam, now there is a Shia crescent in the region stretching from Bahrain in the Gulf to Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Thanks to Bush’s democratization now the marginalized Shia majority is power in Iraq.

Moreover, the Report maintains that the US has a series of ‘disincentives and incentives’ to influence the Iraqi policies of Iran and Syria. Though true, there are no guarantees that even if both countries were eager to ‘help’ the US, their ability to play a constructive role is rather questionable. At best they could reduce their support to some of the groups within Iraq but such a passive role is unlike to make any difference. While it is always easier to meddle in the affairs of other countries, brining about stability would require far reaching capability, influence and political power. Short of an outright occupation, neither Syria nor Iran is likely to bring about the change visualized by the ISG report.

Critics of the Report highlight Baker’s past role in legitimizing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Beginning with his desire to waive an anti-Saddam grand coalition following the Kuwait crisis of 1990 and the post-war Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, the then Secretary of State was more than accommodating towards President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria. In return for Syrian willingness to join the anti-Saddam war front and peace talks with Israel, the US recognised and some might argue even legitimised the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

Things have changes since then. Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, independence from Syrian presence and control has become a prime issue in Lebanese politics. Hence, there are fears in the region accommodation with Syria would come at the cost of Lebanon and its fragile independence.

In short, far from resolving the Iraqi quagmire, engagement with Iran and Syria would create new problems for President Bush than visualized by the Baker-Hamilton Report.

Saturday, December 23, 2006

Iraq Study Group

Bush’s 80th option?
Asian Tribune Dec 23, 2006

US President George Bush would be disheartened by the prognosis and recommendations of the Iraq Study Group (ISG). The report prepared by a team headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Democrat Congressman Lee Hamilton came to the conclusion that was privately aired in the US for months: that the situation in Iraq is rapidly deteriorating, the current policy of the Bush administration could not be sustained and that a major course correction is overdue.
While not being dramatic, the ISG did not mince words. It rejected the theme song of the Bush administration that the US was ‘winning in Iraq.’ On the contrary, "the ability of the US to influence events in Iraq is diminishing." It depicted the situation in Iraq to be grave saddled with sectarian warfare, growing violence and "a slide toward chaos." Because the ‘violence is increasing in scope and lethality’ the ‘stay on course’ is not an option for the US.
Sixty-one out of 79 Recommendations of the ISG pertains to domestic Iraqi situations and the measures that were to be taken by the Iraqi government headed by Nouri al-Maliki and highlights three prime tasks before the Iraqi government that periodically figures in the Report: national reconciliation, security and governance.
While highlighting a number of specific tasks before the Iraqi people, the Report admits that continuing violence could lead to "greater chaos… a collapse of the Iraqi government" and splitting of the “country along sectarian lines." Unless arrested quickly, the country could slide into a catastrophe.
Yet the Report was blunt and unequivocal: if Iraqi government fails to deliver substantial progress, then the US "should reduce its political, military or economic support for the Iraqi government." Short of major crisis, it also set early 2008 as the possible date for the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq. The absence of open-ended presence, the ISG hoped would induce the Iraqi government to take much needed measures to ensure its principal goals of reconciliation and security.
Bush’s real headaches come in the foreign policy recommendations of the ISG. If the US could unilaterally invade Iraq, the Report concluded that any resolution of the mess would demand the cooperation of the international community and the immediate formation of the Iraq International Support Group that would comprise of all those countries and players who have a stake in a stable and united Iraq.
The Report had also had repudiated, debunked and overwrote some of the popular notions and policies of the Bush administration regarding Iraq. A number of critical components of the Iraq policy went by the way side and they include:
• No remapping of Iraq but the country would stay united;
• No territorial division of Iraq;
• No regime change in Iran and Syria;
• Any resolution of the Iraqi crisis would also mean resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, a linkage that the US had rejected when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990;
• The so called axis of evil, Iran has a positive role to play in Iraq;
• Direct American diplomatic engagement of Iran and Syria; and
• US has no intension of controlling the Iraqi oil
Indeed with the sole and notable exception of the al-Qaeda elements, the Report advises the President to engage with all the players both inside and outside Iraq. In its assessment the US "can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try and resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests."
The members of the ISG however, do not have any illusion that their report even if implements would be that ‘magic formula’ that could turn around the situation in Iraq. In its views, the recommendations as "the best strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region."
Had such recommendations been made by an individual, group or institution, the Administration could dismiss them as partisan. The bipartisan nature of the ISG makes thinks difficult for the President. The Group was also equally categorical: no cherry picking of the 79 recommendations. It sees the Iraq crisis a part of the larger crisis in American foreign policy as well as turbulence in the Middle East and hence views its recommendations as comprehensive and holistic. More or less the bipartisan group has taken a take-it-or-leave approach.
Given his growing unpopularity highlighted by the biannual congressional elections in November, the President will have no stomach to reject the Recommendations. Since the Baker-Hamilton report has rejected some of their pet theories, the neo-cons would surely retaliate and come with an alternative course of actions. Given the harsh ground realities, it is extremely unlikely that they could come with friendly option that also viable.
Having pursued a unilateral policy on Iraq, it would not be easy for President Bush to make a u-turn and prepared to adopt the recommendations of the ISG and start courting Iran and Syria. Much of the external recommendations go against some of the basic foreign policy formulations of the Bush Administrations.
Even if they were implemented there are no guarantees for success. For example constructive engagement with Iran and Syria, as recommended by the ISG not mean that they could bring down sectarian violence in Iraq.
Thus, instead of looking at the Baker-Hamilton recommendations, President Bush might consider the 80th option. Accept that his Iraqi policy was a failure and unpopular. The drastic situation in Iraq needs a dramatic solution. Short a reversal, Bush will not be able to satisfy the ISG. While he and his team might be pushed by a messianic zeal, the Middle East, especially Iraq is not ready for democracy. Even the ISG does not claim that their recommendations are a recipe for success.
Thus, in stead of courting all-and-sundry, President Bush might consider handing over Iraq to Saddam Hussein. So long as the latter agrees to protect sensitive American interests in the Middle East and elsewhere, Bush could afford to live with his nemesis returning to the presidential palace in Baghdad. What happens then?
P R Kumaraswamy the writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.