India: Iran
Indian Express (New Delhi), Monday, July 17, 2006
New Delhi will be eager to know what the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who arrives this week, has to offer on the three major issues that, of late, are troubling the bilateral relations.
Since the Cold War ended, Indo-Iranian relations were on the upswing and enjoyed a rare foreign policy consensus in the country.
Both Congress and the BJP invested considerable political capital in promoting strong ties with Tehran. The high point trend was the hosting of President Mohammed Khatami as the chief guest of the 2003 Republic Day celebrations.
But lately, especially since the surprise victory of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad an year ago in the Iranian elections, a downhill movement has started.
From New Delhi’s point of view, three issues dominate and undermine the bilateral agenda.
First and foremost, India is apprehensive of Iranian nuclear ambitions. Agreed, the manner in which India expressed its concerns vis-a-vis this issue may be questionable and New Delhi could have handled its vote at the IAEA more tactfully. But given the A Q Khan connection, India would have opposed Iran even without the American angle. Furthermore, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, India is on the same side as China and Russia: a nuclear Iran is a threat to its long-term strategic interests.
Any peaceful and diplomatic resolution will require Iran’s ability and willingness to swiftly, unequivocally and decisively convince the international community, especially the IAEA, of its peaceful intentions.
While New Delhi does not see any military solution to the conflict, it also does not share Iranian penchant for dragging its feet.
Mottaki might also recognise that even though India does not command the kind of power and influence enjoyed by China and Russia, its intentions are more transparent that the other two.
The perceived sympathy of these countries towards Iran is nothing more than a leverage to secure better deals from Washington. If the price is right, neither will not hesitate to “abstain” from any crucial vote in the Security Council. Iran can’t ignore a harsh reality: like the US, both China and Russia are opposed to Iran going nuclear.
India might also use the recent meetings with other leaders from the middle-east, especially King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’s Emir al-Sabah, to get the point across to the Iranian visitor. Their concerns and apprehensions over the perceived Iranian hegemony is real and could not be wished away by political rhetoric.
Further, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran will not be able to cite the Indian nuclear tests as a precedent, even in private. India might tell Mottaki that in the event of a confrontation with the international community, Tehran will not be able to count on India’s support.
In 1991, Saddam Hussein underestimated the opinion of the international community over Kuwait and Iraq paid the price. Hopefully, Ahmadinejad wil look for a better example than Saddam to emulate.
Second, India will also be keen to resolve the issue of the tri-nation gas pipeline. Despite considerable American displeasure and pressure tactics, India has been committed to the idea of strengthening energy cooperation with Iran. Until such time as the pipeline becomes a financially feasible proposition, India is prepared to increase the quantity of gas imports from Iran.
At the same time, Mottaki might also realise that gas export is a two-way trade and India is not the only beneficiary. A broad picture of India’s energy diplomacy vis-a-vis countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Russia might indicate that Iran will also be a loser if the gas deal falls through. A detailed picture of the extent of Indian investment plans in other parts of the world might convince the visitor that Iran, though important, is not India’s only option. While it is legitimate for Iran to demand a higher price, India will not be dictated to. Not by Washington and not by Iran.
Third and most importantly, Iran has only one address in India: Government of India. While the country can benefit from India’s democratic polity and avenues, its ability to influence the official Indian policy has to stick to certain norms.
At the height of the domestic controversy over the IAEA vote, an impression was created that Iran was trying to influence the policy by befriending certain quarters that were critical of the Manmohan Singh government.
In the early 1990s, Iran sought to play up the Shia factor and there were suggestions of tacit Iranian involvement in the Kashmir upsurge. Now it is playing footsie with the Left, which has emerged as a bitter critic of the government over Iran’s nuclear puzzle.
Mottaki might be reminded that so long as India does not have similar avenues in his country, Iran might avoid getting embroiled in Indian domestic politics. Diplomacy is a two-way street!
In short, be it nuclear, gas or domestic politics, India will be waiting for some serious and convincing answers from Mottaki.
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posted by P R Kumaraswamy at 10:34 AM
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