Jordan: Zarqawi as a 'martyr'

Zarqawi’s death tests Jordan's tolerance

By celebrating al-Zarqawi as a 'martyr,' Jordanian Islamist lawmakers have tested the boundaries and reignited a heated debate about their role.

Commentary by P R Kumaraswamy for ISN Security Watch (09/08/06)

Ever since the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the alleged leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, his home country Jordan has found itself embroiled in a tense domestic crisis. Denying the request for his burial in Zarqa, Jordan vowed that al-Zarqawi, who is held responsible for a triple suicide bombing in Amman in November 2005, would never be allowed to "stain" the country's soil.

After the bombings that killed 60 people, most of them Jordanians, al-Zarqawi became the target of widespread condemnation and indignation from his fellow citizens. Responding to public anger, al-Zarqawi's family was quick to publicly renounce ties to him.

But his death at the hands of the allied forces changed that, with his family seeking to capitalize on the widespread sympathy in the Islamic world for his brutal attacks against US-led coalition forces. His brother said that al-Zarqawi “is a martyr and should be treated as such.”
As is the custom, after his death his family of organized a function where al-Zarqawi was hailed and celebrated for his “martyrdom.”

Among the attendants were four members of parliament belonging to the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Charging them with “inciting violence,” the state was quick to initiate criminal proceedings against the four lawmakers. They were arrested and tried by the military prosecutor at the State Security Court. While one was subsequently released, the remaining three were charged on 24 July with “fuelling national discord and inciting sectarianism.”

“By glorifying Zarqawi, the deputies are sending the wrong message to youth by justifying terrorism and equating terrorist acts with jihad, as well as encouraging someone like Zarqawi as their idol,” the prosecution said.

The Hashemite Kingdom remains the only country in the entire Arab world to tolerate, recognize and permit an Islamic political party and to allow them to participate in elections. With 17 seats in the 110-member parliament, the IAF is a major force in Jordan.

By hailing a mortal enemy of the state as a "martyr" and "holy warrior," the Islamists have crossed the line and renewed the debate about their own roles and activities in Jordan.

The speaker of Jordan's lower house of parliament, Abdul Hadi Majali, has demanded that the IAF “announce allegiance to Jordan and its Hashemite leadership and renounce all terrorist acts by Zarqawi and all forms of terrorism.”

On 6 August, two Islamist lawmakers were given prison terms ranging from 18 months to two years. They were also given symbolic fines. The third lawmaker was acquitted because “his action did not constitute a crime.”

The whole controversy underscores five significant trends in Jordan. On the first level, there is some sympathy inside the country for al-Zarqawi and his actions in Iraq. To an extent, the Islamists' support for the militant's family should be seen as a barometer measuring the views among sections of the Jordanian population on the US-led occupation of Iraq.

On the next level, this is not the only occasion when the IAF has been at odds with the government. In recent years, the Islamists in Jordan have been at the forefront of opposition to the normalization of relations with Israel and have organized popular protests to that effect. Similarly, since 1999, the Islamists have been trying to protect the interests of the Palestinian militant group Hamas in Jordan.

Thirdly, supporting a perpetrator of terrorism is simply unacceptable for Jordan. Any tolerance towards such actions by members of parliament not only offers sanctity to terrorism but also undermines Jordan's ability and willingness to prevent a repetition of the triple bombing. Since its confrontation with the Palestinians in September 1970, Amman has been extremely wary of internal violence that would undermine not only the country's stability but also the survival of the kingdom.

Fourthly, unlike other Islamist movements in the Middle East, the IAF has established a modus vivendi with the palace and has flourished. However, by adopting a position vis-à-vis al-Zarqawi that is at odds not only with the palace but also with the wider Jordanian public, the Islamists have clearly tested the limits of tolerance.

Finally, the sentencing of the Islamist lawmakers has altered the ground rules. It would be safe to conclude that the IAF would not accept the onslaught easily. Any expulsion of the two convicted lawmakers from parliament could force the leadership to pullout of the parliament and plunge the country into a deep political crisis. Despite the period row between the two over domestic and foreign policy issues, the political participation of Islamists in enhances the credibility of the Hashemite Kingdom.

At the same time, however, as King Abdullah warned in no uncertain terms, the Islamists “have to redefine their relationship with us. They have been working in the grey area for the past decades.”

Thus, Sunday’s verdict could well be the beginning of a new equation between the Islamists and the palace.

P R Kumaraswamy teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Lebanon: Neutrality

Lebanese neutrality, the only way-out

No peace plan will work unless Lebanon's neutrality is secured despite actors using the country as a playground for their own campaigns.

Commentary for ISN Security Watch (08/08/06)

Any ceasefire in the Middle East will be fragile unless there are fundamental changes in the international policy towards Lebanon. It will also be temporary unless more than lip service is paid to the fact that compared to Israel, it will be much more difficult to reign in a non-state actor such as Hizbollah.

For over six decades, Lebanon has been a playground for various internal militia and external powers. The Maronite Christians, the dominant political force in the country, looked to Paris for political support. Partly to ensure the independence of Lebanon, France also moved close to Syria, its former mandate territory. As a result, since the June war of 1967, Paris has been the principal Western supporter of Syria.

It was the French abandonment of Syrian president Basher al-Assad that enabled Washington to push through anti-Syrian moves in the UN Security Council, such as Resolutions 1559 (seeking Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon) and 1680 (demanding for Syrian recognition of Lebanon). This French shift also enabled the US to move closer to Lebanon.

Syria has been the second player in Lebanon. Even sixty years after the latter was formed, the Syrian leadership has yet to come to terms with Lebanon's independence.

The outburst of civil war in 1975 enabled Syria to intervene militarily in Lebanon. Initially, the Syrian intervention was aimed at preventing Maronites and Sunni Muslims from slaughtering each other.

However, the Syrian presence gradually became a source of resentment, especially within the context of Syria's refusal to recognize Lebanon's independence. The savior soon became an occupier. It was the assassination of former anti-Syrian prime minister Rafik al-Hariri in February 2005 that precipitated a hasty Syrian withdrawal. Still, Syria maintains its influence and to some Lebanese, even covert presence.

Israel is another player in Lebanon. Except for a brief intervention during the 1948 war, Lebanon did not participate in the Arab-Israeli wars. However, the presence of various Palestinian militant groups and their Fedayeen guerrilla in the 1970s dragged Lebanon into a conflict with Israel. This eventually led to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the subsequent occupation of the country's south until the summer of 2000 when Israel unilaterally pulled out of Lebanon.

The prolonged quiet along the the Israeli-Syrian border was compensated by both countries using Lebanon as their battleground. Devoid of military or diplomatic options vis-à-vis Israel, Syria has used Hizbollah as an effective leverage against Israel.

Further complicating matters, Israel has used Lebanon as a dumping ground for scores of Palestinian deportees, including hundreds of Hamas militants who were dropped in the no-man's land north of Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon in December 1992.
Fourthly, since its foundation in the early 1980s, the Shi'ite Hizbollah has emerged as a powerful player in Lebanon. Its protracted and often lethal military attacks against Israeli forces and their Christian allies in southern Lebanon were primarily responsible for the eventual Israeli pullout. Its role as a hardened resistance force has endowed it with international recognition, regional admiration and wider following among Muslims, Shias and Sunnis alike.

Hizbollah has continued to pursue actions that are neither discussed with nor endorsed by the Lebanese government, including the recent incursion into Israel and the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers that effectively started the latest conflict.

Palestinians represent the fifth group of player-warriors in Lebanon. They came to Lebanon primarily as refugees after having been expelled by Jordan following the attempts by Palestinian militants to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy. Under a deal worked out by Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser hours before his death in September 1970, Lebanon agreed to host various Palestinian militant groups, including the Palestinian Liberation Organization, led by the late Yassir Arafat. These groups were granted the political space to operate and carry out attacks against Israel. This state-within-state arrangement however, sowed the seeds of a civil war that lasted for over 15 years.

Though much international attention on Resolution 1559 is focused on disarming Hizbollah, any implementation would also cover the Palestinian militants who control and operate most of the refugee camps in Lebanon.

Lebanon has thus, been turned into a dangerous playground for inter-group rivalry, inter-state conflict and private militias that pursue their own goals, violently and independently of the central authority.

Even a regional power would not be able to confront and contain these challenges, and the Lebanese army is symbolic at best and inadequate at worst.

Even a robust and interventionist UN force along the Israeli-Lebanese border could only be a temporary solution.

To restore peace, the international community, especially the UN Security Council would have to recognize, declare and guarantee Lebanese neutrality - a neutrality not only vis-à-vis its neighbors but also vis-à-vis the private militia within.

While ensuring Lebanese neutrality will not be any easy task, it would still be more effective than the periodic fighting over Lebanon that does nothing but leave human suffering in its wake, destroy the economy and empower one non-state actor over another until the cycle begins again.

Web Link:

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16491

India: Hezbollah

India sidesteps the thorny issue of Hezbollah


Exclusive to Asian Tribune, August 8, 2006

On 31 July the Lok Sabha passed an unanimous resolution expressing India’s sentiments and concerns vis-à-vis the ongoing violence in the Middle East. Reflecting the traditional Indian position towards the region, it expressed its concern over the violence and condemnation of Israel.

This 246-worded resolution, however, has diluted India’s earlier stand on the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. A day after the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers, which precipitated the current conflict, New Delhi was more categorical. Even though it was critical of Israel’s “excessive and disproportionate military retaliation” against the Lebanese infrastructure, it was equally critical of the Lebanese militants. Without explicitly naming Hezbollah, the official statement categorically declared: “India condemns the abduction of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006 by Lebanese militants and calls for their immediate release.”

It is undeniable that the conflict has brought about colossal human tragedy and destruction of infrastructure. The resolution pointed out the conflict has “resulted in the killing and suffering of large number of innocent civilians, including women and children, and caused widespread damage to civilian infrastructure.”

The Indian lawmakers however, pretended that these sufferings are confined only to Lebanon. By focusing exclusively on the Lebanese dimension of the problem, the resolution gives a wrong and misleading impression that the destruction and casualties are one-sided.

Since the conflict began, Hezbollah has been directly targeting residential areas and its leader Hassan Nasrallah has been periodically threatening to strike at Tel Aviv. Besides the Ministry of Defence, the greater Tel Aviv area does not have any target of military significance. The barrage of rockets from Lebanon had forced more than quarter of a million Israelis to leave their homes in the north and to seek refuge in the central and southern Israel.

The partisan nature of the resolution becomes exposed when the House “conveys the deepest condolences, sympathy and support of the people of India to the people of Lebanon at this difficult time.” This is a reminiscent of the past when the India did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. While sympathy for the people of Lebanon is legitimate, fair and honourable, the resolution makes it a zero-sum game.

In the long run such blatantly one-sided wording would severely undermine India’s role and influence in the Middle East. Any post-ceasefire peace agreement would require the support and understanding of all parties to the conflict. By adopting an explicitly anti-Israeli position the Lok Sabha has undermined India’s role in any UN peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon, especially if the unarmed UN observers were replaced or strengthened by a robust force.

Likewise, the Lok Sabha was not prepared to explicitly recognise and accept Israel’s concerns but rather preferred to settle for generalities. According the lawmakers, “lasting peace and security in the region” would have to take “into account the legitimate interests and grievances of all the parties concerned.” Was it too sensitive to mention Israel’s concerns explicitly? But why?

One could attribute a number of possible explanations for the shift in India’s position from the early days of the conflict and its anti-Israeli tenure of the Lok Sabha resolution. There is a gradual shift in the position of the Arab states vis-à-vis the crisis. Even states such as Saudi Arabia who earlier were critical of the ‘misadventure’ of the Hezbollah have modified their positions. Partly due to domestic public opinion in support of the Hezbollah and partly due to Israel’s massive retaliation, the mainstream Arab states find it difficult to condemn the Shia militants in Lebanon when that country is under siege. India’s shift is also a reflection of this trend.

Two, the government of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh survives on the outside support of the Left parties. Of late, these parties who are both part of the government and part of the opposition, have been wielding considerable influence on India’s foreign policy. Since the outbreak of the recent violence in the Middle East, the Left parties have renewed their anti-Israeli antics. While remaining silent on the Hezbollah angle, these parties have been demanding the government to immediately suspend all military deals with Israel.

As the fighting went into its second week, Communist Party of India (Marxist) General Secretary Prakash Karat demanded that India should work for the imposition of international sanctions against Israel. Within days as many as 86 MPs belonging to various parties made a similar demand. With the Indo-US nuclear deal coming under widespread criticisms from the Left and Right, Prime Minister Singh could not afford open a new front over Lebanon.

Three, as the fighting intensified a number many were critical Israel for its excessive use of force. For the Indian politicians it was politically correct to maintain a studied silence on the role of Hezbollah in the entire drama. Even the Bharatiya Janata Party known for its pro-Israeli views thought it prudent the follow the general consensus in the Lok Sabha.

Four, India has rarely appreciated the internal nuances of various countries in the Middle East, especially Lebanon. Used to the conventional binary portrayal of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is unfamiliar with the confessional and complex politics of Lebanon.

Furthermore, its traditional understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also coloured India’s views vis-à-vis Lebanon. For many in India there are not much difference between Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. Both are perceived as forces that are ‘resisting’ the Israel occupation. The larger problem of Hezbollah undermining the authority of the central government in Beirut and thereby the stability of Lebanon, is rarely understood in India. Many Indian intellectuals are ignorant of the Syrian non-recognition of Lebanese independence and sovereignty. Hence, Indian leaders are not an exception in not appreciating the nuances of Lebanon and the inherent differences between Hamas and Hezbollah. If India supports the former, the logic goes; it should also support the latter, because both are fighting Israel.

Above all, Indian leaders have rarely appreciated the dilemma faced by others in combating terrorism and other forms of political violence. The Israeli experience of fighting fire-with-fire may not be replicated in other parts of the world. Likewise, other states could not be expected to follow the Indian practice of negotiating with groups that kidnap its citizens (from the Rubaiya Sayeed episode in December 1989 to the Kandahar hijacking in December 1999) Such a strategy might work in India but there are no guarantees that it would be effective in other parts of the world.

Thus, when the violence eventually stops in the Middle East, Indian leaders and political parties would have to learn a think or two about the delicate art of diplomacy.

Web version

http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/1446