India: Bangladesh

The Hasina visit and Bangladeshi elections

Exclusive to Asian Tribune June 29, 2006

‘Political pilgrimage!’ That is how a functionary of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) described the recent visit of former Prime Minister and leader of opposition Sheikh Hasina to India. He was also playing with Hasina’s visit to the shrine of Sufi Saint Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddhin Chishti at Ajmer, the other purpose of her visit.

If one were to take the claims of the Awami League seriously, Hasina came India primarily to receive ‘the prestigious’ Mother Teresa award conferred upon her by a little-known NGO based in Kolkata.

If people were mistaken that Hasina was indeed the incumbent Prime Minister of Bangladesh, they could not be faulted. India did not want to give any ‘wrong signal’ to the Bangladeshi government and hence usual the trappings diplomatic protocols were conspicuous by their absence.

There were however, substantial interactions between the visitor and a host of Indian leaders. Among others Hasina met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Congress President Sonia Gandhi, former Prime Ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee and I K Gujral and Leader of Opposition L K Advani. While Defense Minister Pranab Kumar Mukherjee hosted a private lunch in her honor, she also met junior Foreign Minister E Ahmad. During her brief stopover in Kolkata, she met former West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu and thanked him for his cooperation in the conclusion of the 1996 Ganges accord signed during her tenure.

Given the intensity with which Bangladeshi politicians conduct their affairs, Hasina could not avoid hammering on the failures of the BNP-led coalition and doubted whether the next general elections would be free and fair and then headed for home.

The contrast

As they say, timing is everything. Hasina’s visit came just over three months after the visit of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia to India and only a few months before the Jatiya Sangsad elections slated for early 2007.

Since coming to power in October 2001, Khaleda had traveled world over but avoided going to India. For long it was suggested that protocol demanded that it was the turn of the Indian Prime Minister to make a state visit to Dhaka before Bangladeshi Prime Minister could come to India. But when Khaleda finally decided to come to India, this protocol demand was not fulfilled.

The March visit of Khaleda was hastily arranged. Other than two unimportant agreements, it did not address any of the myriad of problems that plague the bilateral relations. The issue of Bangladeshi trade deficit figured only marginally. This lackluster trip some seasoned observers to ponder: why did she come? What was the need for India to roll out red-carpet welcome for an agendaless trip?

This is not true for Hasina. Whether in office or in opposition she had periodically visited India and courted its support, made all polite noises on sensitive issues and often used her trips to carry on her anti-Khaleda tirade.

For its part, India has been equally warm towards Hasina. Irrespective of the party in power, New Delhi had always showed a soft corner for Hasina. The historic ties with Hasina’s father Bangabandu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as well as the shared secular ethos of the Awami League and mainstream Indian leadership forged a bond between the two. Hence, Congress or BJP, the Indian leaders have been extremely warm towards Hasina and did not hide their preferences, if it came to that.

Furthermore, when she was attacked during an Awami rally in August 2005, Indian leaders made concerned inquiries which naturally irked the Khaleda government. Likewise the killing of former finance minister and senior Awami leader Shah AMS Kibria in January 2005 led to India’s refusal to attend the summit meeting of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) originally slated for the following month.

Indeed, the coziness that Hasina generates in India, often contributed to the anti-India sentiments of the BNP and its allies.

Hobson’s choice

It is undeniable that Hasina and the Awami are friendlier towards India than Khaleda and the BNP. Indian leaders have often found it easier work with the former and have often difficult to communicate with the latter and establish a modicum of relations. Nor was the Awami ever compelled to raise the anti-India antics during elections. Above all Awami and its leadership are seen as a moderate, liberal and culturally inclusive political force in Bangladesh. Unlike others, Awami has been in the forefront of defending the rights of the Hindu minorities and cultural pluralism.

These very same factors also work against the Awami. As the country is increasingly becoming intolerant and conservative, liberal space in Bangladesh is shrinking. Its proximity towards India makes the Awami an easier target for the BNP and its allies. Since the Hindu minorities are traditionally viewed as Awami supporters, there is no incentive of the BNP to speak for their rights and protect them from extremist violence.

There is however, a much larger dilemma. Even if Hasina were to return to power, most of the problems that confront the Indo-Bangladeshi relations will continue. The Awami has no answers to problems such as flow of illegal immigration into India, mounting trade deficit or suspected presence of Indian militants inside Bangladesh. As highlighted by the controversy over the supply of Bangladeshi gas, its pro-India image would be a liability for the Awami League and will prevent it from making even the minimum concessions that are needed for an agreement.

The issue is not being closer to India but being able to alleviate the Indian concerns. Hence, Awami victory per se in the 2007 elections will not ensure an improvement of Indo-Bangladeshi relations.

However, having hosted Khaleda and Hasina in quick succession, India perhaps might consider inviting leaders from the Jatiya Party as well as the Jama'at. This would complete the circle of its non-partisan attitude towards Bangladesh when that country is heading for an acrimonies election fever.

Web link

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India: UNSG Election

India's risky UN Gamble
Sun, 2006-06-18 03:46
P R Kumaraswamy - Exclusive to Asian Tribune
By deciding to field Shashi Tharoor as its official candidate for the post of Secretary-General, India has taken a risky, avoidable and potentially disastrous gamble at the UN. Official spin notwithstanding, the move implies that India has given up its aspiration for a seat in the UN Security Council. At least in the short run.

Many countries both in Asia and elsewhere world will warmly endorse the Indian position of rotation “under which the next Secretary-General of the UN should be from Asia.” Indeed veteran socialist leader U Thant of the then Burma, now Myanmar, was the last Asian to occupy that position until he was killed in a tragic accident in September 1961.

At the same time, many countries even within Asia will have serious reservations of New Delhi’s subtext that an Indian should be that candidate. If an Asian had not occupied that post for over four decades, it is equally true that no woman had ever occupied it since the founding of the UN more than 60 years ago.

Tharoor, currently Under Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information, hopes to follow the footsteps of Kofi Annan. As under Secretary-General under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Annan succeeded his boss. Since Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden took office in 1953, every Secretary-General secured a second term.

Boutros-Ghali was the only exception. Got carried away by the support he enjoyed among the Third World countries, he needlessly stepped on the American toes only to be denied re-election. Capitalizing on this situation, his deputy Annan of Ghana staged a spectacular backroom coup and got elected in 1996 and was re-elected five years later.

Indian mixed signals

By conventions, great powers, especially permanent members of the Security Council, have shied away from aspiring for the highest elected office in the world. Since the election of Trygve Lie of Norway in 1945, it has always gone to smaller, influential and often neutral countries. Over the years the UN and the office of Secretary-General has become highly politicized and proximity to a great power would only add further criticisms and impede the functioning the person holding that office.

In throwing its hat in the ring, India has created a host of problems for itself. This move comes against the backdrop of its on going campaign for a permanent seat in the Security Council. Its ambition for a seat at the high table is visible and at times too blatant and brazen. Seen in the context of earlier refusal by the great powers to aspire for this position, one can draw two conclusions.

Within hours after the Indian announcement Pakistan’s ambassador at the UN Munir Akram reminded the world: “It is a tradition that the permanent members of the UNSC or countries aspiring to be its permanent members do not field candidates for the post of the UN Secretary General.” Simple English? India has given up its Security Council aspirations, at least for now. As some have pointed out, Tharoor’s election could indeed be a liability for India’s leadership ambitions.

Alternatively one could accept the contention of the Indian spokesperson that its desire for Security Council membership and its candidacy for Secretary-General “are separate issues and it is incorrect to perceive India’s support for one as dilution of our commitment to the other.” In that case this would mean India is consciously breaking the tradition set by the great powers even before its entry into the elite club!

Lacking sub-regional consensus

Secondly, India belongs to Asia but India is not Asia. The Indian move thus comes against the background of a number of other Asian candidates who had expressed similar interests. Among others, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon, Thai Deputy Prime Minister Surakiat Sathirathai, veteran Sri Lankan diplomat Jayant Dhanapala and Singapore’s former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong are mentioned as possible candidates. If India is there, Pakistan won’t be far behind, especially for such a heavy-weight contest.Islamabad has already indicated its desire to field a candidate for the job.

In geographic terms it means candidates from major sub-regions of Asia namely, East Asia, South East Asia and South Asia. At present some have more than one candidate and need agree on a consensus choice who could then be the common candidate for Asia, should a context with other continents become inevitable.

If this proves difficult then there could be more than one candidate from Asia who could be presented to the outside world. To reach such a continental consensus, sub-regional consensus becomes essential. Given their common political understanding and worldview, countries of the South East Asia might agree more easily than South Asia.

Ideally the India should have worked quietly and announced a common candidate acceptable to all the countries of South Asia. Not only this did not happen, now there are two perhaps three candidates from the seven-member sub-region. It is also not clear whether India has consulted other potential candidates before announcing its decision. Most likely it did not.

High-risk gamble

By seeking a position thereto avoided by great powers, India is sending a wrong message to the smaller countries. Its leadership ambitions and this move do not synchronize and many would see it as a reflection of confused state Indian foreign policy.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly, on the “recommendation” of the Security Council. New Delhi should have taken a second look at the Boutros-Ghali episode. Despite the overwhelming support he enjoyed, his re-election ambitions were quashed because of the opposition from Washington. Even though he enjoyed the support of other great powers US President Bill Clinton squarely vetoed him. Even Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s pleading did not change the situation.

Right now it is not clear whether Tharoor’s candidacy was broached diplomatically with others or that India secured the support of the permanent members. So far the US is not prepared to disclose its views on any of the candidates, including Tharoor. It is safe to predict which way the east wind from China will blow. Electing an Indian to the Secretary-General would be seen as an international recognition of India not just of Tharoor, something Beijing would not like to bestow.
Therefore, the Chinese endorsement of Tharoor will not be that easy and Beijing would extract substantial concessions or quid pro quo from New Delhi on other areas. If a Pakistani is in the race for Secretary-General, there is no need for second guessing.

China’s long term interests lay in identifying, supporting and promoting candidates from small countries. This way it could present itself as their well wisher, champion and perhaps leader. With China’s veto power, it will not be easy for India to cross the initial hurdle and reach a contest stage.

Conclusion

It is a high-risk gamble that India should have avoided. India no longer enjoys the overwhelming support of the Third World or non-aligned movement. Hence, a contest, if it eventually comes to that would reveal the extent of India’s popularity and standing. These are unchartered waters.
On his own Tharoor is a well-respected, widely recognized and scholarly person who understands not only the nuances of high-profiled diplomacy but is also equally at home with the sufferings of the faceless, impoverished and illiterate millions who live in urban slums or rural landmasses far and wide.

Tharoor perhaps has better chance of winning the converted post by playing up his UN credentials and underplaying his Indian connections. The central issue is not his personal qualities or qualifications but his Indian tag. Most scholars would be unable to identify the nationality of current chief Annan. Tharoor will not have that anonymity or luxury. There lies the real problem.

P R Kumaraswamy, teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

India: Oil Diplomacy

India’s slippery oil diplomacy

Commentary for ISN Security Watch (14/06/06)

The most significant fallout from India’s galloping economic growth is its increasing dependency on imports to meet its hydro-carbon demands. Unlike China, it is yet to emerge as a major player in the global energy market. But three developments are bound to alter this situation for ever: India’s growing demands for hydrocarbon; its dwindling domestic supplies; and the increasing globalization of Indian oil companies. These will shape and influence how India views its energy security and guide its long-term desire of stable sources of energy supplies.

The petroleum bill constitutes the bulk of India’s total imports and accounts for most of its trade deficit with the Middle East and elsewhere. For example, last year India's trade deficit stood at about US$29 billion, while its oil bill alone was over US$34 billion. Economists have universally agreed that by 2020, nearly 80 per cent of India’s hydrocarbon needs would have to be met by imports.

In the 1990s, India imported large quantities of refined products but the entry of private sector into the market has drastically increased India’s refining capacity. As a result, since 2001, India has emerged a net exporter of petroleum products. This will further increase demands for oil and gas resources.

Even without the current high oil prices, securing stable supplies at affordable prices has been high on the Indian agenda. The economic reforms and the bourgeoning financial resources of the state-owned oil companies have led India to pursue an aggressive oil policy.

This policy operates at two levels. In the first place, India is slowly moving away from its erstwhile practice of spot purchases and short-term contracts. These measures were unavoidable in the past, but stable and assured sources of supplies are essential if India is to push forward its economic growth. Moreover, some of the massive petrochemical plants in the country could not depend upon such ad hoc arrangements.

One such successful arrangement was the supply of 7.5 million metric tonnes (mmt) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) annually from Qatar. Under this arrangement, the Gulf state agreed to supply India with LNG for 25 years, with the first shipment delivered in March 2004. A similar arrangement with Iran for the supply for five million metric tonnes of gas through pipelines has hit a few rough spots largely due to the ongoing tensions between the US and Iran over Tehran’s suspected nuclear ambitions.

The second strategy has been in the realm of upstream markets whereby Indian companies invest in the exploration, production, and export of oil and gas in foreign fields. During the past few years, Indian companies have been actively involved in a host of countries. The OVL, the export arms of the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Commission, alone plans to acquire overseas oil and gas equity of 20 million tonnes by 2010. The company is active in 14 countries and has acquired 23 projects. Among others, it is operating in Vietnam, Russia, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Myanmar, Australia, and the Ivory Coast and is exploring avenues in Algeria, Indonesia, Nepal, Iran, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. In January 2005, the Indian company Reliance secured exploration rights in Oman. The largest Indian activity is in the Sakhalin oil fields in the Russia, where India has invested a whopping US$ 1.7 billion.

Such a strategy underscores India's determination to aggressively pursue an energy security policy and to minimize if not escape from disruption or fluctuation of supplies due to conflicts, natural calamities, or other unforeseen developments.

This strategy, however, comes with a price tag. Because India is new to this highly charged and competitive market, it faces a number of difficulties.

Questionable markets

In some cases, India entered into the oil market in countries at the receiving end of international criticism and sometimes even isolation. Sudan is a classic example of one such country that has become a major market for Indian investment and exploration. India already has invested over US$700 million in the GNOP oil fields in Sudan, and is currently working on a major pipeline project there. But India's entry into Sudan coincided with the civil war there and the departure of Western oil companies.

The same is true of Burma (Myanmar). In addition to its reservations about the policies of the military junta, Indian nationalists have had close ties with the father of the country's imprisoned pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Its eagerness to explore Burma's energy potentials, as well as its desire to minimize Chinese influence there compelled India to sidestep the democracy issue.

India's problem with Bangladesh is somewhat different. Though geographically closer, gas supplies have been bogged down by periodic tensions and differences between the two. Despite its mounting trade deficit of over US$1 billion, Dhaka has been reluctant to contemplate gas exports to India, and the question has become a politically sensitive one in Bangladesh. As a result, bilateral differences over trade concessions prevented Dhaka from participating in the Indo-Burma gas pipeline, which would have benefited Bangladesh.

There are also cases in which Indian interests have come into direct conflict with the policies of the US. During much of the 1980s, Iraq not only supplied large quantities of oil but also provided political support to India on key issues such as disputed Kashmir. As such, Iraq could have been the ideal candidate for India’s oil diplomacy. But with the Kuwait crisis of 1990 and the subsequent UN sanctions, Iraq was rendered off limits to India. The post-Saddam Hussein political reality in Iraq is too fragile and unstable for India to consider any long-term investment in the oil sector. Similarly, the US-led oil embargo against Libya following the Lockerbie bombing affected Indian interests.

In recent years, Washington's policy vis-à-vis Iran over the nuclear question and its opposition to the construction of a pipeline between Iran and India via Pakistan practically stalled the estimated US$40 billion gas deal. In the end, India's desire for a civilian nuclear energy deal with Washington dictated.

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) passed by US Congress in 1995 explicitly called for sanctions against any oil major that made an “investment” of more than US$20 million in one year in Iran. While India has so far avoided any oil-related sanctions, it remains vulnerable to US pressures. A recent report for the Congress suggested that while the overall India-Iran gas deal “would not appear to constitute an ‘investment’ in Iran’s energy sector, as defined by ILSA,” it hinted that that construction of LNG pipeline would be problematic.

The proposed Iranian pipeline as well as the extension of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline to India also have security dimension. For long, Indian security establishments have expressed reservations about having its strategic energy supplies pass through Pakistani territory. Furthermore, in recent years, pipelines in the Pakistani province of Balochistan have often been sabotaged, thereby raising pipeline safety concerns.

Syria is another country where India is actively pursuing the oil exploration – a fact that pits New Delhi against Washington, which considers Damascus part of the "axis of evil". The same is true of the Indian interests in Venezuela, whose President Hugo Chavez portrays himself as the new crusader against US imperialism.

This energy drive has resulted in India evolving a mixed policy vis-à-vis China. At one level, geo-strategic realities compel New Delhi to seek friendlier ties with Beijing. Wherever possible it takes that extra step to ward off any impression that New Delhi has been working in tandem with Washington in containing Beijing. At the same time, however, their growing energy needs intensifies Sino-Indian competitions in third countries. Last year, India lost energy deals in Kazakhstan and Nigeria to Chinese oil companies. Indian officials cried foul when China eventually won the Kazak deal. Similarly, belated Indian interests and involvement in Burmese oil fields were partly spurred by its concerns over China and its strategic presence in that country.

At the same time, the Sino-Indian energy search is not always competitive. Wherever a country in question has controversial relations vis-à-vis Washington, China finds India to be a useful partner. Both are cooperating in the development of the Yadavaran oil fields in Iran, and under the preliminary agreement negotiated in October 2004, the state-owned Chinese oil giant SINOPEC would obtain a 51 per cent stake in Yadavaran, while the ONCG would get a 20 per cent stake. Likewise, Chinese and Indian state-owned oil companies have been collaborating in Sudan and Syria.

Macro energy picture bleak

The macro energy picture, however, is rather bleak, as India’s dependency on imports for its hydrocarbon needs would only increase as its economy grows. Indeed, domestic supplies account for just 30 per cent of India’s crude oil demands, and the government admits that “India’s oil import dependency is likely to grow beyond the current level of 70 per cent.”

The entry of India signals a departure from the past, and its oil companies are willing and able to actively pursue the overseas oil market, including exploration and production. At the same time, as new comers, they are yet to appreciate the competitive nature of the market or the high political cost involved in oil deals. Some of India’s foreign policy choices often impinge upon its energy requirements and vice versa. Oil diplomacy will thus be a slow but slippery learning curve for India.

Web link

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16174

India: Kuwait

Re-energising the gulf bilaterals
P.R. Kumaraswamy
Indian Express (New Delhi) Tuesday, June 13, 2006

When Shaikh Sabha al-Ahamd al-Jaber al-Sabah arrives in India on Wednesday for a six-day state visit, he would be marking a new phase in Indo-Kuwaiti relationship. The brewing troubles over Iran and the resultant tensions in the Persian Gulf would figure prominently during his visit. India has significantly moved away from its erstwhile opposition to the presence of non-regional powers in the Gulf region and can now understand the security dilemmas of smaller states like Kuwait. In private deliberations with Indian leaders, the Kuwait delegation can be expected to be more candid about their apprehensions over a nuclear Iran.

But the visit will also be a milestone in the bilateral relations and signals an end to the long rupture between the two countries, following the Iraqi invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. Given that a large number of Indian workers were stranded in Kuwait in that period, none would have complained if India were to tread a delicate path.

Furthermore, there were strong political, economic and even ideological reasons that prevented India from actively criticising the Iraqi invasion. The Baathist ideology of Iraq attracted the Indian nationalists. In the post-Nasser era, they found the Iraqi leaders more in tune with their brand of secularism. This also explains why India refused to condemn Iraq for its aggression against and prolonged war with Iran in the 1980s. Indeed, until the 1990s Iraq remained India’s closest friend in the Middle East and its relations with Tehran during this period could be described as ‘correct’ rather than close.

But the government headed by V.P. Singh went overboard. Egged on by a powerful segment of the intelligentsia, India gave the impressions that it was siding with Baghdad over the blatant aggression. Indeed a bus stop near the Kuwaiti embassy in New Delhi was quietly renamed ‘Railway Museum Stop’.

Not just the government, even the mainstream intelligentsia sided with Iraq over Kuwait. Seminars organised by think-tanks propagated views that went to the extent of questioning the legitimacy of Kuwait as an independent state. Driven by ideological blindness and politically correct anti-American rhetoric, many harped on the imperial hand in the formation of Kuwait. Disregarding the issues of national aspirations of the Kuwaitis, they tacitly endorsed Saddam Hussein’s claim of Kuwait being the 17th province of Iraq. As a result, less than two weeks after the Iraqi invasion, then foreign minister, I.K. Gujral, became the first foreign leader to meet Saddam Hussein.

Even hours before the commencement of Operation Desert Storm on 17 January 1991, Indian diplomats based in the Middle East were predicting “peaceful” resolution. Meanwhile the government changed and Chandra Shekar, who became the prime minister, subsequently sought to minimise the damage by providing logistical support to American planes that were operating from Diego Garcia.

But the damage to Indo-Kuwait relations was substantial. Besides strong historic connections until 1961, the Indian rupee was the legal currency in Kuwait. Many Kuwaitis felt let down by the Indian refusal to stand up against a blatant aggression. India became a fair weather friend, who could not be counted on in times of crisis.

The widely publicised Gujral-Saddam hug cost India dearly. According to former foreign secretary, J.N. Dixit, not just Kuwait but many Arab countries did not forget the incident easily. Indeed when he return to government in the late 1990s, none of the Gulf countries invited Gujral.

New Delhi’s traditional focus on Palestinians in dealing with the Middle Eastern countries did not work with Kuwait. During the occupation the Palestinian leadership, especially Yasser Arafat, sided with Saddam Hussein. This dented the Palestinian-Kuwaiti relations beyond repair. Indeed, despite repeated American pressures, Kuwait refused to host Arafat until his death in Novemer in 2004.

India’s policy towards the Middle East since the Kuwait war underwent significant changes. It has gradually moved away from Iraq, forged closer ties with Iran and sought to minimise the role of Pakistan in cultivating countries such as Saudi Arabia. With its accelerating economic growth, much of India’s policy toward the Gulf countries has been focussed on energy needs. Qatar and Oman have emerged principal players in India’s long-term energy plans.

But normalisation of relations with Kuwait remained a slow and painful process. Since the visit of then foreign minister, Madavsinh Solanki, in February 1992, India has been trying to mend fences with the Gulf sheikhdom. Even though media reports then were not very favorable, as Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s envoy he opened the door for a dialogue. The effort has been bi-partisan when leader of opposition, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Kuwait in October 1997 and numerous officials exchanged visits.

Though long-term cooperation in energy security would dominate the bilateral agenda, the visit of Emir al-Sabah would be primarily a climax of that reconciliation. As Kuwait’s foreign minister during the 1990-91 crisis it would not have been easy for him to see his Indian counterpart hugging the aggressor. Hopefully both sides have learnt from the past. Therein lies the importance of al-Sabah’s visit.

Web link

http://www.indianexpress.com/story/6327.html