ISG Report and Iran Syria

Engaging the Adversaries: Easier said than done

Among the 79 recommendations suggested by the Iraq Study Group (ISG), one stands out loud and clear: the US should engage with its adversaries not just friends. Or in its words “a nation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflict and differences consistent with its own interests.” In the present context of Iraq, this would mean negotiating with Iran and Syria. This would be necessary, the Report suggests because, “Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively.”

Unfortunately however, this is easier said than done.

First and foremost, this would imply that President Bush abandoning his six-year rhetoric against both these countries. In his State of the Union address in 2002, he called Iran part of the axis of evil. While Syria did not formally earn this dubious distinction, the Bush administration resolutely kept itself from Damascus and sees it as a hindrance to its interests and policies in the Middle East. The support provided to Islamic militant groups like Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah are often used to reject any meaningful role for Damascus. Its refusal to recognize the Lebanese independence as demanded by UN Security Council resolution 1680 did not help matters either.

Iran is a different kettle of fish. Since the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the hostage crisis, both countries have not come to terms with one another. The historic baggage was too heavy for either of them to adopt a meaningful non-emotional attitude about the other. The nuclear controversy surrounding Iran and the periodic outbursts of Iranian President Ahmadinejad have only made matters worse. At least in the foreseeable future, a substantial dialogue let alone reconciliation looks remote.

However, according to the authors of the ISG, both these states have an interest in the unity and stability of their Arab neighbour and could play a constructive role in bringing about an improvement in the Iraqi situation.

The former argument is rather easy to understand. Further chaos and eventual disintegration of Iraq would not serve the interest of any of Iraq’s neighbours including Iran and Syria. While both countries would like to enjoy a role for themselves or even meddle in favour of one or other groups within that country, balkanization of Iraq is a different matter. Any division of that Arab country along sectarian lines would have far reaching consequences for Iran and Syria as well. In recent months Iran has troubles with its Arab minorities while ruling establishment in Syria is controlled by the Alawi minority.

The report prepared by a team headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Democrat Congressman Lee Hamilton went on to claim: ‘Iran’s interest would not be served by a failure of US policy in Iraq.” It is essential to recognize that notwithstanding the anti-American rhetoric in public, since the 1990s Iran had immensely benefited from the American policy in the Middle East. The reversal of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, prolonged sanctions against Baghdad, the regime change in the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and finally the removal of Saddam Hussein from power were Iranian dreams but made possible by the policies of the ‘Great Satan.’

Likewise, Iranian officials gloat in private that thanks to Uncle Sam, now there is a Shia crescent in the region stretching from Bahrain in the Gulf to Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Thanks to Bush’s democratization now the marginalized Shia majority is power in Iraq.

Moreover, the Report maintains that the US has a series of ‘disincentives and incentives’ to influence the Iraqi policies of Iran and Syria. Though true, there are no guarantees that even if both countries were eager to ‘help’ the US, their ability to play a constructive role is rather questionable. At best they could reduce their support to some of the groups within Iraq but such a passive role is unlike to make any difference. While it is always easier to meddle in the affairs of other countries, brining about stability would require far reaching capability, influence and political power. Short of an outright occupation, neither Syria nor Iran is likely to bring about the change visualized by the ISG report.

Critics of the Report highlight Baker’s past role in legitimizing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Beginning with his desire to waive an anti-Saddam grand coalition following the Kuwait crisis of 1990 and the post-war Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, the then Secretary of State was more than accommodating towards President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria. In return for Syrian willingness to join the anti-Saddam war front and peace talks with Israel, the US recognised and some might argue even legitimised the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

Things have changes since then. Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, independence from Syrian presence and control has become a prime issue in Lebanese politics. Hence, there are fears in the region accommodation with Syria would come at the cost of Lebanon and its fragile independence.

In short, far from resolving the Iraqi quagmire, engagement with Iran and Syria would create new problems for President Bush than visualized by the Baker-Hamilton Report.

Iraq Study Group

Bush’s 80th option?

Asian Tribune Dec 23, 2006

US President George Bush would be disheartened by the prognosis and recommendations of the Iraq Study Group (ISG). The report prepared by a team headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Democrat Congressman Lee Hamilton came to the conclusion that was privately aired in the US for months: that the situation in Iraq is rapidly deteriorating, the current policy of the Bush administration could not be sustained and that a major course correction is overdue.

While not being dramatic, the ISG did not mince words. It rejected the theme song of the Bush administration that the US was ‘winning in Iraq.’ On the contrary, "the ability of the US to influence events in Iraq is diminishing." It depicted the situation in Iraq to be grave saddled with sectarian warfare, growing violence and "a slide toward chaos." Because the ‘violence is increasing in scope and lethality’ the ‘stay on course’ is not an option for the US.

Sixty-one out of 79 Recommendations of the ISG pertains to domestic Iraqi situations and the measures that were to be taken by the Iraqi government headed by Nouri al-Maliki and highlights three prime tasks before the Iraqi government that periodically figures in the Report: national reconciliation, security and governance.

While highlighting a number of specific tasks before the Iraqi people, the Report admits that continuing violence could lead to "greater chaos… a collapse of the Iraqi government" and splitting of the “country along sectarian lines." Unless arrested quickly, the country could slide into a catastrophe.

Yet the Report was blunt and unequivocal: if Iraqi government fails to deliver substantial progress, then the US "should reduce its political, military or economic support for the Iraqi government." Short of major crisis, it also set early 2008 as the possible date for the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq. The absence of open-ended presence, the ISG hoped would induce the Iraqi government to take much needed measures to ensure its principal goals of reconciliation and security.

Bush’s real headaches come in the foreign policy recommendations of the ISG. If the US could unilaterally invade Iraq, the Report concluded that any resolution of the mess would demand the cooperation of the international community and the immediate formation of the Iraq International Support Group that would comprise of all those countries and players who have a stake in a stable and united Iraq.

The Report had also had repudiated, debunked and overwrote some of the popular notions and policies of the Bush administration regarding Iraq. A number of critical components of the Iraq policy went by the way side and they include:

• No remapping of Iraq but the country would stay united;

• No territorial division of Iraq;

• No regime change in Iran and Syria;

• Any resolution of the Iraqi crisis would also mean resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, a linkage that the US had rejected when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990;

• The so called axis of evil, Iran has a positive role to play in Iraq;

• Direct American diplomatic engagement of Iran and Syria; and

• US has no intension of controlling the Iraqi oil

Indeed with the sole and notable exception of the al-Qaeda elements, the Report advises the President to engage with all the players both inside and outside Iraq. In its assessment the US "can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try and resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests."

The members of the ISG however, do not have any illusion that their report even if implements would be that ‘magic formula’ that could turn around the situation in Iraq. In its views, the recommendations as "the best strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region."

Had such recommendations been made by an individual, group or institution, the Administration could dismiss them as partisan. The bipartisan nature of the ISG makes thinks difficult for the President. The Group was also equally categorical: no cherry picking of the 79 recommendations. It sees the Iraq crisis a part of the larger crisis in American foreign policy as well as turbulence in the Middle East and hence views its recommendations as comprehensive and holistic. More or less the bipartisan group has taken a take-it-or-leave approach.

Given his growing unpopularity highlighted by the biannual congressional elections in November, the President will have no stomach to reject the Recommendations. Since the Baker-Hamilton report has rejected some of their pet theories, the neo-cons would surely retaliate and come with an alternative course of actions. Given the harsh ground realities, it is extremely unlikely that they could come with friendly option that also viable.

Having pursued a unilateral policy on Iraq, it would not be easy for President Bush to make a u-turn and prepared to adopt the recommendations of the ISG and start courting Iran and Syria. Much of the external recommendations go against some of the basic foreign policy formulations of the Bush Administrations.

Even if they were implemented there are no guarantees for success. For example constructive engagement with Iran and Syria, as recommended by the ISG not mean that they could bring down sectarian violence in Iraq.

Thus, instead of looking at the Baker-Hamilton recommendations, President Bush might consider the 80th option. Accept that his Iraqi policy was a failure and unpopular. The drastic situation in Iraq needs a dramatic solution. Short a reversal, Bush will not be able to satisfy the ISG. While he and his team might be pushed by a messianic zeal, the Middle East, especially Iraq is not ready for democracy. Even the ISG does not claim that their recommendations are a recipe for success.

Thus, in stead of courting all-and-sundry, President Bush might consider handing over Iraq to Saddam Hussein. So long as the latter agrees to protect sensitive American interests in the Middle East and elsewhere, Bush could afford to live with his nemesis returning to the presidential palace in Baghdad. What happens then?

P R Kumaraswamy the writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Web link:http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/3802

Saddam Verdict

Saddam: more queries than answers

Indian Express, (New Delhi), November 07, 2006

The much-awaited death sentence handed to the former Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, creates more complications than it solves. He was convicted for the killing of 148 civilians in 1982 after a failed assassination attempt. Hussein, who has the automatic right to appeal, also faces similar charges for the death of scores of his opponents and Iraqi Kurds.

Predictably, reactions both within and outside the region were along partisan lines. Those who were at the receiving end of Saddam Hussein’s fury greeted the decision as fair and appropriate. Anything short of a death sentence would have meant that their ordeals would remain a forgotten incident in history. For the Kurds and Shias of Iraq, Saddam symbolised the brutal face of the Ba’athist regime. For the same partisan reasons, the Sunni Arabs who had benefited under the Hussein dispensation, opposed the verdict as an American conspiracy.

Likewise, Iran and Kuwait — the two states who were at the receiving end of Saddam’s aggressive designs — are more than happy to see him hanged. Despite its political differences with Washington, the Islamic Republic of Iran had been pleased to see his removal by the US-led forces. The US accomplished what the ayatollahs had always wanted but could never achieve: the removal of Saddam and his trial and execution for the war crimes he had committed against the Iranians.

The same holds true for Kuwait, which he sought to invade in 1990. Even though the US-led multilateral alliance restored status quo ante the following February, Kuwait had never forgiven him for his aggression. It was no accident that one of the first actions of the post-Saddam Iraqi government under then prime minister, Iyad Alawi, was to seek reconciliation with the Gulf sheikhdom. Likewise, the US was pleased with the verdict. President George Bush responded quickly and Washington saw this verdict as “a milestone” in Iraqi history and “a major achievement” for the young democracy and constitutional order in Iraq. That the former dictator was not killed during a military operation but was duly tried in an Iraqi court would be presented as a vindication of US efforts to sow the seeds of democracy in Iraq. As for the Republicans, they see the verdict’s timing — coming as it does days before the crucial bi-annual elections in the US — as a divine intervention that may rescue them from losing control of the US senate.

The reactions in other parts of the Middle East are mixed. Many see it as a US-imposed verdict handed down by a kangaroo court. The continued US occupation would be another factor that clouds the impartiality of the judicial process. While not many countries in the region have a positive view of the brutality unleashed by Saddam Hussein against his own people, they have found him to be an effective rallying point against their own Arab rulers and their Western supporters, especially the US. He has, in fact, emerged as a champion of the down-trodden and a battle cry against US hegemony.

As the UN-sanctioned economic blockade imposed by the US was strangulating the Ba’athist regime, Iraq found widespread support among the Arab masses. This became even more acute when the US planned to invade Iraq. Even those Arab states which wanted Saddam Hussein’s removal were too afraid to identify with the US agenda against Iraq and chose to criticise in public the American designs on Iraq.

The partisan reactions to the verdict symbolise the passion Saddam Hussein generated while he was in office. Short of acquittal, the death sentence was an inevitable verdict. At one level, it might usher in a constitutional process that relies on due process, something that has been alien to Iraq and many other countries in the region for a long time. At another, the verdict would not solve any of the mounting problems facing Iraq and its immediate neighbours. In fact, it will intensify and fuel the sectarian violence with the Sunni Arabs using the verdict as their new rallying point.

Thus, despite the actual charges, the Saddam Hussein trial was intensely political. The implications of this verdict will be felt far beyond Iraq.

Web version

http://www.indianexpress.com/story/16108.html

India: Arab Media

Indian broadcast laws as an anti-Arab 'conspiracy'

Exclusive to Asian Tribune, August 30, 2006

Earlier this month, an Arab daily published from Saudi Arabia charged that India has banned "Arab TV channels under pressure from Israel." Citing Saudi businesswoman who was unable to watch her favourite Arab channels during a visit to Mumbai, the Arab News charged that New Delhi "has succumbed to mounting Israeli pressure and ordered a nationwide ban on the broadcast of Arab television channels."

According to the daily, unnamed sources "within the government" described the move as an exercise "to browbeat Arabs and show them as terrorists. The government is subscribing to the absurd arguments that channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya promote hatred and encourage terrorism."

In its assessment, this unfriendliness towards the Arabs was in contrast to past Indian policies under Mrs. Indira Gandhi. It viewed the ‘ban’ as a sad reflection of India’s democracy.

This allegation was quickly picked up sections of India as it fitted fits well within the ideological worldview of the Indian Left. The Communist Party of India condemned "the ban on Arab TV stations, while allowing all other channels which support Israel’s aggression and horrendous acts of bombing." Describing it an "unfriendly move", it called on the government to lift the ban.

However, as it turned out, there was no ban. Less than 24 hours after the story first broke, the union government, through the junior Foreign Minister E Ahmad, denied any ban against Arab TV channels. He attributed the ‘disappearance’ of the Arab channels to their failure to confirm to the new down linking guidelines that were issued last November.

In a subsequent statement in the Lok Sabha, Information and Broadcasting Minister Priyaranjan Dasmunsi declared that all channels that had failed to conform to the new guidelines were taken off air. Describing the row as "a malicious and baseless accusation against the government by interested quarters", he disclosed that these Arab TV networks "had not applied to be down linked in India" while as many as 65 channels from abroad applied for the same.

Even if one ignores the technical and legal issues, one can not ignore the commercial angle. The extend of Arabic knowledge in India is still marginal. A vast majority of the Indian Muslims who recite Quran in its original are not well-versed in Arabic. Their recitation of the holy book should not be seen as a proof of their Arabic knowledge. In other words, if one does not watch mandarin channels in Saudi Arabia, it was not because Riyadh is anti-Chinese but because it is commercially less viable.

Two, the speed with which the Left embraced the unverified allegations also indicated the prevailing political climate in India. In recent years, the Middle East has become a highly charged foreign policy issue in India. It has become politically correct and publicly popular to join the anti-Americanism. This is most apparent in the public reactions in India to situations such as Iranian nuclear controversy, Iraqi quagmire and the Lebanese crisis. They are largely due to narrow domestic calculations, pressures from the Left, ideological blindness, partisan politic, lopsided Indian understanding of the Middle East complexities. For the vocal segment of the Indian intellectuals, it is fashionable again to be anti-Israeli.

Three, not many Indian know that Al-Jazeera is not banned in Israel but is available through the cable networks. For long, Israel also had regular correspondents and journalists from the Qatar-based news channel that has been regularly critical of Israel. If the channel is available to its citizens, it becomes illogical for Israel to seek its banning in other parts of the world, including India.

On the contrary, many Arab states including Saudi Arabia from where Arab News is published, has banned any media contacts with Israel. Arab and Muslim journalists who visit or make professional contacts with Israeli leaders are regularly condemned, isolated and even threatened physically. In countries such as Egypt and Jordan, national press associations act against their members who visit the Jewish State.

Four, Al-Jazeera has another interesting angle. Despite public criticisms, an Israeli mission functions from the Qatari capital. In July this year, Israel went to the extent of officially naming Ro’i Rosenblit as the head of its mission in Doha. In short, the hostilities of the al-Jazeera broadcast did not prevent Israel from seeking, maintaining and even publicizing its relations with Qatar. On the contrary, such a situation offers an additional incentive for Israel to court that Arab country.

Five, the row underscores a much larger problem. Over the years, the Middle East has become a harbinger of conspiracy theories. Unable to find logical explanations for global events, a vast majority of Middle Eastern leaders, commentators and ordinary public have imbibed conspiracy theories. It is often easier to embrace a conspiracy than to look for hard and often uncomfortable answers.

Indeed for years Pakistan charged that there was an Indo-Israeli conspiracy against the larger Islamic world. Gradually sections of Egyptian media joined the chorus and accused that New Delhi exploded some Israeli devises during the nuclear tests India conducted in May 1998. Now the Indian broadcasting laws are seen as an anti-Arab conspiracy. Instead of looking at the non-compliance by Arab TV channels, people have argued that India has adopted an anti-Arab policy due to Israeli and American pressures.

So, it is not surprising that the Arab News, did not carry the official Indian rebuttal.

Web link

http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/1768

India: New Foreign Minister

Mukherjee as Foreign Minister: Political Heavy Weight to political wilderness?

Exclusive to Asian Tribune October 25, 2006

After nearly a year, India at last got a Foreign Minister in the form of veteran Congress leader Pranab Kumar Mukherjee. It would have taken considerable persuasion on the part of Congress President Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to make Defence Minister agreeing to move to the External Affair Ministry.

His reluctance was both natural and inevitable. Like many other countries in the world, foreign policy has never been a major agenda in India. The foreign policy debates have been dominated by a small but vocal segment of intelligentsia, most of them based in the capital. The rest of the teaming millions are oblivious of the developments in far off lands. Naturally, professional politicians, especially those with larger ambitions, rarely envisage any interest in the foreign office.

Thus, since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru the Foreign Ministry is not considered a coveted position in the cabinet. During every cabinet formation, the tussle has always been for powerful ministries like Home, Finance and Defence. It is not accidental that most Prime Ministers also functioned as India's Foreign Ministers. Even when senior cabinet colleagues looked after the Ministry, sensitive issues pertaining to foreign policy has always been the prerogative of the Prime Ministers.

In moving Mukherjee to this position, Manmohan Singh sought to achieve some coherence in foreign policy.

Advantages

Mukherjee looking after the Foreign Ministry would free Manmohan Singh from running the day-to-day affairs. Partly because of this problem, in recent months the Indian Prime Minister has become a frequent flyer. His periodic absence from India could be partly mitigated by the Mukherjee's new responsibility.

Two, since the UPA came to power in 2004, some of Singh’s cabinet colleagues were at odds with the Prime Minister’s worldview. His fondness for closer ties with Washington did not enjoy the unanimous support of the cabinet. The position of former Foreign Minister Natwar Singh and current Panchayat Raj Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar over the government’s policy towards Iran could be cited as an example. There is a widespread belief that Natwar Singh was even kept out of loop when India decided to vote against Iran at the IAEA. Likewise, with his diplomatic background, Aiyar even tried to run a parallel foreign policy to pursue his energy diplomacy.

There are no indications that such differences exist between the Prime Minister and his new Foreign Minister. The manner in which Mukherjee promoted closer cooperation with the Pentagon underscore that both share a common towards promoting the Indo-US ties.

Moreover as a political heavy weight, his cabinet colleagues would be weary of stepping on to his toes on foreign policy matter as happened during the tenure of Natwar Singh.

At the same time, Mukherjee’s reluctance to move to the South Block was also understandable.

Why the reluctance?

One, despite his long political career and diverse experience, Mukherjee's tenure at the foreign office has been rather brief. He was one of the three Foreign Ministers who served under Narasimha Rao when the foreign policy remained firmly under the control of the Prime Minister. That Manmohan Singh could function without a full-fledged foreign minister for over 11 months indicates that there was no urgency. While it was good that the country has a regular foreign minister, this status quo could have continued without much difficulty. This means that Mukherjee is taking over a Ministry, which was functioning without much difficulty. So long as the broad foreign policy guidelines are available, professional diplomats could run the ministry with little help or interference from the few junior ministers. In short, while they would be happy to have a cabinet minister, the foreign office could also function without one.

Two, the media hype over his appointment does not hide that there is little need or scope for innovation. Mukherjee would not be able make any difference to some of the principle issues that dominate the current Indian foreign policy agenda. On issues like closer ties with the US, need to engage with Pakistan or improve political relations there will not be any shifts. In some of these issues, the Defence Ministry could add substance to political understanding worked out by the Foreign Office. He would be carrying out the policies set in motion by the Prime Minister and pursued by the mandarins during the absence of a minister.

Three, as External Affairs Minister Mukherjee would have to undertake a lot of overseas travelling. In recent months due to the absence of the Foreign Minister, Mukherjee has emerged as a key interlocutor with the great powers including China and represented the country at the annual session of the UN General Assembly. This would only increase considerably. On the flip side, this would also mean he would have far less time for internal developments and nurturing his political constituency.

Since taking office earlier this month, the new Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon has more or less settled down. Those who were disappointed at his elevation have either left the service or were suitably accommodated elsewhere. Some of the key positions within the Ministry are either filled or in the process of being filled.

As a professional, he would not easily agree to party functionaries being posted abroad as diplomats. Some of the recent political appointees like Aneil Matherani, Natwar Singh’s choice for Croatia, only brought embarrassment. These would mean that there is little scope for Mukherjee to bring about any substantial changes at the organizational level.

Above all, the Foreign Ministry offers far less scope for political patronage, a must for all politicians. Like his predecessor Natwar Singh, Mukherjee might go for an advisory board saddled with his favourites and cronies. Beyond that, there is little scope for bestowing brownie points for loyalty. This in political terms would mean less scope for building and consolidating support base.

In short, a political heavy weight running a ministry that lack political power.

Demotion?

Seen in this overall context, it is possible to interpret Mukherjee’s shift as a demotion. As a seasoned troubleshooter, his hands are full with mired problems facing the government, party and ruling coalition. With his prime ministerial ambitions, he would have to take care of his support base in West Bengal.

Above all the Defence Ministry gave him considerable media coverage, scope for extensive domestic travel and financial clout with the industry. As the most conservative branch of the establishment, the Defence Ministry also shielded him from political controversies.

Mukherjee will soon miss all these at his new abode.

Web version
http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/2770

India: Egypt

Mubarak is busy, Please mail the Nehru award

Exclusive to Asian Tribune, Friday, 7 July 2006

The nadir of Indo-Egyptian ties can be gauged by the importance that the latter attaches to the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding conferred upon President Hosni Mubarak. Nearly a decade after the Indian decision, the Egyptian leader is yet to find time or inclination to make a trip to New Delhi and formally receive the award.

This Egyptian behaviour is in contrast to the attitude of others. Of late India has become a favourite destination for many world leaders. None could blame India if it lost count of heads of state and government who are making a beeline to New Delhi. During the last decade it hosted two sitting American Presidents, scores of western leaders and other heads of state. Even countries of the Middle East have also discovered its growing importance and in recent years, India had many visitors including King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, President Mohammed Khatami of Iran and the new Emir of Kuwait.

At times such crowded visits also have their flip side. Overshadowed by the visit of President George Bush, French President Jacques Chirac’s sojourn a few days earlier rarely made ripples in the Indian media.

Cold wind from Cairo

Yet Egyptian leader had no time for India. The attitude of the present Egyptian leadership reflects its changing priority towards India. On a few occasions, Indian diplomats in Cairo publicly declared that New Delhi was looking forward to the visit of President Mubarak but in vain.

In normal circumstances, this should not raise any eyebrows as countries formulate state visits depending upon their relative importance, diplomatic useful and economic potentials.

In case of Egypt however, there is a catch. With much fanfare and some diplomatic calculations on 24 July 1997, an eminent selection committee headed by the then Vice President K R Narayanan nominated Egyptian President Mubarak for the Jawaharlal Nehru award for the year 1995. Besides recognizing the contribution of the Egyptian leader to international peace, especially in the Middle East peace process, the honour was also meant to garner some diplomatic mileage.

Given the negative signals from Cairo over the Indo-Israeli normalization carried out in January 1992, New Delhi hoped that the Nehru award might partly mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities. Indeed, partly to pacify the Egyptian concerns and misgivings in early 1992 New Delhi even opened the Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo.

Ironically however, nearly a decade later the award is yet to be presented because Mubarak is too busy to visit India. One two occasions, his visit was planned only to be cancelled at the last minute. Once Indian President Narayanan was indisposed and on the second occasion, the ever turbulent Middle East prevented the Egyptian leader from making that trip. Hence, a decade later, Nehru award for 1995 is still languishing in New Delhi.

According to procedures, a seven-member jury headed by the Vice President selects the awardees, with the Chief Justice of India functioning as ex-officio member. Thus, since July 1997 when Mubarak was selected for the award, India had seen two new vice presidents and as many as nine new Chief Justices.

The miss appears deliberate. For over a decade Mubarak has skipped even multilateral meetings hosted by India. In 1993 for example, at the last moment he cancelled his participation in the much publicised G-15 summit of developing countries. Similar moves by others resulted in the summit being postponed to 1994 but Mubarak still failed to show up. Partly to express his displeasure, in May 1998 Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee skipped the G-15 summit this time hosted by Cairo.

Without mentioning Mubarak by name, in December 2002 the government told the Rajya Sabha, “The Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for the year 1995 was awarded in the year 1997. Despite concerted efforts having been made, the Awardee has not yet been able to come to India to receive the award.”

Proudly admitting the honor conferred upon its leader, the official cite of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry proudly maintains “India continuously renews the invitation to President Mubarak to … receive the prize.” But it offers no any explanation for the prolonged hesitation on the part of the Egyptian leader.

Time to change

By conferring awards named after leaders such as Nehru, India hopes to secure and promote its interests in foreign lands. Indeed, they play an important role in India’s cultural diplomacy. In it in this context one should view the efforts by the Indian foreign office to name principal streets and corners in different parts of the globe after Mahatma Gandhi.

Cultural diplomacy has often played an important role in India’s foreign relations, especially in the Middle East. With the aim of promoting Indian influence and culture artists, dancers, film stars and other cultural teams regularly visit the region and elsewhere. “Anthony” Bachchan still remains more popular in the Arab world than any other Indian icon, past or present.

Even if one were to ignore the absence of reciprocal gesture, the failure of Egypt to arrange Mubarak’s visit indicate the current status of the Indo-Egyptian ties. Even the highly publicised visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 was insufficient to instil a sense of urgency in Cairo’s diplomatic calculations vis-à-vis India.

The attitude of the present Egyptian leadership towards India is in total contrast to the hay days of the 1950s when Nehru’s friendship with Gamal Abdul Nasser dominated India’s Middle East policy. Cairo was for a constant fixture in Nehru’s periodic sojourns to Europe and both leaders met nearly a dozen times. Indeed, in its early days much of India’s Middle East policy was influenced by the Nehru-Nasser factor.

Things have changed and so is the Egyptian worldview. Likewise time has come for New Delhi to re-examine its cultural diplomacy. With the next announcement of Nehru award around the corner, India should evaluate the political importance that the awardees attach to such honours. If India does not take the memory of its venerable leaders more seriously, others will not.

Web link

http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/974

Middle East Controversies

"The Middle East: Unbearable Status Quo versus Unpredictable Changes", Mediterranean Quarterly, vol 17, no.1, Winter 2006, pp.116-132

Full Text
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v017/17.1kumaraswamy.pdf

*
"Who am I: The identity crisis in the Middle East", MERIA, vol.10, no.1, March 2006

Full text
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a5.html

*

"Monica Lewinsky in Middle Eastern eyes", Middle East Quarterly, vol.6, no.1, March 1999
Full text
http://www.meforum.org/article/471

Minority Question

* "Problems of studying minorities in the Middle East", Alternatives, vol.2. no.2, summer 2003. Full text at
http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/kumar.htm

New Arrival: Dictionary

Scarecrow Press has just published my Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

About the BOOK:

"Anyone seeking key facts on the Arab-Israeli conflict is going to find this an extraordinarily useful reference work."—Dr Anthony H Cordesman, The Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

"P.R. Kumaraswamy has taken on a Herculean but necessary task in trying to explain this key Middle Eastern issue fairly, systematically, and comprehensively in a single volume. The fact that he has succeeded in doing so will be valuable for both researchers and those who simply want to understand better the most complex and important region of the contemporary world."—Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs Center

From the blurb:

For over a century, the conflict between the Arabs and Jews has remained the most intractable problem confronting the world. Hardly a day passes that the Arab-Israeli Conflict is not headlined in the media. It has turned the Arabs and Israelis against one another, and also embittered relations within the two communities, while drawing the rest of the world into the circle of disruption.

The Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict provides factual background through a list of acronyms and abbreviations, an introductory essay, a chronology, a bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on the more significant persons, places and events, including the various wars and negotiations. The history, religion, culture, and archeology that this rivalry has sparked between the Arabs and Israelis over the same piece of territory is traced in this book, which offers the essential details using neutral terms and thereby allowing readers to draw conclusions for themselves.

You can find additional information at:

http://www.scarecrowpress.com/Catalog/SingleBook.shtml?command=Search&db=%5EDB/CATALOG.db&eqSKUdata=0810853434

MONOGRAPHS

Israel’s New Arch of Friendship: India, Russia and Turkey, (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, Research Papers, 2005), pp.46

The "Strategic partnership" between India and Iran, Special Report 120, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, (Washington, April 2004), (co-authored with Robert M Hathaway et al)

Web link

http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/asia_rpt_120rev.pdf

India-Israeli Relation: Humble Beginnings, a Bright Future, (Washington, DC: American Jewish Committee), 2002,

Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations, (Memorandum no.55), (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies), March 2000, pp.81.
Web link

www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo55.pdf

India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership, (Security and Policy Studies, No.40) (Ramat Gan: BESA Centre for Strategic Studies), September 1998, pp.62.

Web link

www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/40pub.html

Political Legitimacy of the Minorities: Israeli Arabs and the 1996 Knesset Elections, (The Emirates Occasional Paper No. 20), (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies Research), 1998, pp.61.

Israel’s China Odyssey (Delhi Papers 2), (New Delhi: IDSA, 1994), pp. 95.

BOOKS

Israel and Islam, (London: Routledge) (forthcoming), (co-edited with Efraim Karsh)

Security Beyond Survival: Essays for K Subrahmanyam, edited, (New Delhi: Sage, 2004)

Israel, the Hashemites and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle, (co-edited with Efraim Karsh), (London: Frank Cass, 2003)

Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, (edited) London: Frank Cass, 2000)

China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence, (edited) New Delhi: Sage, 1999)

Israel-Pakistan Web Articles

Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations, (Memorandum no.55), (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies), March 2000, pp.81.
Web Link
www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo55.pdf]

“The strange parallel careers of Israel and Pakistan” Middle East Quarterly, (Philadelphia, PA), vol. 4, no. 2, June 1997, pp.31-39
Web link
http://www.meforum.org/article/348

Israel-China Relations Web Articles

“At what cost Israel-China Ties?”, Middle East Quarterly, vol.13, no.2, Spring 2006, pp.37-44.
Web Link
http://www.meforum.org/article/926]

Israel-India Relations Web articles

"India and Israel: Emerging partnership", Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.25, no.4, December 2002, pp.192-206

Full text

http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/media/4nc6a0bvth5xwnclwvtp/contributions/v/9/8/u/v98u90uwy938bqcc.pdf

*

India-Israeli Relation: Humble Beginnings, a Bright Future, (Washington, DC: American Jewish Committee), 2002,
Web link
http://www.ajc.org/inthenews/publications.asp?did=521&pid.1220%20&%201219

*

India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership, (Security and Policy Studies, No.40) (Ramat Gan: BESA Centre for Strategic Studies), September 1998, pp.62.
Web Link
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/40pub.html

*

“Strategic Partnership between India and Israel”, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), (Electronic Journal) (Ramat Gan, Israel), vol. 2, no. 2, May 1998;
Web Link
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/1998/issue2/kumaraswamy.pdf

India: UNIFIL

Lop-sided on Lebanon
P.R. Kumaraswamy
Indian Express (New Delhi) 2 September 2006

While other countries are preparing to increase their contribution, it is likely that India will pull out from the UN peacekeeping force that is currently operating in southern Lebanon. The recent remarks of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s special envoy to the Middle East, Chinmaya Gharekhan are a giveaway: “We are not going to disarm Hezbollah. We are not going to fight the Lebanese people.”

According to him, India would not send a peacekeeping force to Lebanon until the UN decides the rules of engagement. Likewise, he told his interlocutors in Beirut that India “does not want to resort to force while dealing with the Lebanese people, resistance, army or anyone else”. India would not be party to any disarming of the Hezbollah, one of the principal elements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

The Security Council was acutely aware that another crisis in Lebanon could be prevented only by reining in the Hezbollah from adopting parallel foreign policies that are independent of the central authority in Beirut. It demanded that “there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon”.

To enable the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon, the Security Council sought to increase the strength of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to 15,000 from its current strength of less than 2000. Besides this, it also authorised the UN forces “to ensure that its areas of operation are not utilised for hostile activities of any kind”. The UN force was to “assist” the Lebanese army “to exercise its authority throughout the country”. This would mean the new UNIFIL will not be monitoring the ceasefire; it will be enforcing peace in southern Lebanon.

It was this enhanced and unchartered mandate that had resulted in many European countries, including France to reconsider their earlier enthusiasm. While resolving the crisis serves the interests of all parties, these countries are afraid of being caught in the Israel-Hezbollah crossfire.

The UN peacekeepers have often became victims of Israeli strikes against the Hezbollah. Furthermore, the UN resolution also calls for an embargo of arms and ammunitions to Hezbollah from Lebanon’s neighbours — Syria and Iran, two key backers of Hezbollah. The new UN force will have to perform functions of a peace enforcer and this in turn places India in a quandary.

Days after the adoption of Resolution 1701, the Foreign Office ruled out the prospects of India sending additional troops. But the recent utterances of Gharekhan raise doubts about the continued Indian participation. The recent crisis has altered the mandate of the UNIFIL and India would not be able to pretend that its contingents would be ‘observing’, not ensuring’, peace along the Israel-Lebanese border. Either India recognises the new ground realities and adjusts its policy or it pulls out of the UN operations in Lebanon.

At one level, since independence India sees its participation in peace keeping missions both as a sign of its commitment to international peace as well as an international vindication of its impartiality. In recent years peacekeeping is also viewed as a ‘great power’ responsibility. Hence, any Indian pullout of Lebanon would severely undermine its aspirations to play an important role in crisis situations.

The indecisiveness over the UNIFIL, also underscore the aged old dilemmas facing India’s Middle East policy.

The unanimous resolution adopted by the Lok Sabha signalled India’s partisan view of the events in the region. While criticising Israeli attacks against Lebanon and its civilian population, the Indian lawmakers were silent on the death and destruction wrought by Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel.

Narrow domestic calculations, constant pressures from the ideological Left, ideological blindness, partisan politic, lopsided Indian understanding of the complex Lebanese reality and pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian sentiments among sections of establishment have resulted in India not being willing to admit the threats posed by radical militant groups such as Hezbollah. Like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hezbollah operates within a sovereign state and pursues an independent and autonomous foreign and security policy that are at odds with the central authority. India’s Special Envoy to the Middle East might believe that Hezbollah is a resistance force and that the Lebanese nation should not be made accountable for the activities of Hezbollah. Then not many will believe Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when he blames President Parvez Musharraf for the actions of LeT.

The writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Jordan: Zarqawi as a 'martyr'

Zarqawi’s death tests Jordan's tolerance

By celebrating al-Zarqawi as a 'martyr,' Jordanian Islamist lawmakers have tested the boundaries and reignited a heated debate about their role.

Commentary by P R Kumaraswamy for ISN Security Watch (09/08/06)

Ever since the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the alleged leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, his home country Jordan has found itself embroiled in a tense domestic crisis. Denying the request for his burial in Zarqa, Jordan vowed that al-Zarqawi, who is held responsible for a triple suicide bombing in Amman in November 2005, would never be allowed to "stain" the country's soil.

After the bombings that killed 60 people, most of them Jordanians, al-Zarqawi became the target of widespread condemnation and indignation from his fellow citizens. Responding to public anger, al-Zarqawi's family was quick to publicly renounce ties to him.

But his death at the hands of the allied forces changed that, with his family seeking to capitalize on the widespread sympathy in the Islamic world for his brutal attacks against US-led coalition forces. His brother said that al-Zarqawi “is a martyr and should be treated as such.”
As is the custom, after his death his family of organized a function where al-Zarqawi was hailed and celebrated for his “martyrdom.”

Among the attendants were four members of parliament belonging to the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Charging them with “inciting violence,” the state was quick to initiate criminal proceedings against the four lawmakers. They were arrested and tried by the military prosecutor at the State Security Court. While one was subsequently released, the remaining three were charged on 24 July with “fuelling national discord and inciting sectarianism.”

“By glorifying Zarqawi, the deputies are sending the wrong message to youth by justifying terrorism and equating terrorist acts with jihad, as well as encouraging someone like Zarqawi as their idol,” the prosecution said.

The Hashemite Kingdom remains the only country in the entire Arab world to tolerate, recognize and permit an Islamic political party and to allow them to participate in elections. With 17 seats in the 110-member parliament, the IAF is a major force in Jordan.

By hailing a mortal enemy of the state as a "martyr" and "holy warrior," the Islamists have crossed the line and renewed the debate about their own roles and activities in Jordan.

The speaker of Jordan's lower house of parliament, Abdul Hadi Majali, has demanded that the IAF “announce allegiance to Jordan and its Hashemite leadership and renounce all terrorist acts by Zarqawi and all forms of terrorism.”

On 6 August, two Islamist lawmakers were given prison terms ranging from 18 months to two years. They were also given symbolic fines. The third lawmaker was acquitted because “his action did not constitute a crime.”

The whole controversy underscores five significant trends in Jordan. On the first level, there is some sympathy inside the country for al-Zarqawi and his actions in Iraq. To an extent, the Islamists' support for the militant's family should be seen as a barometer measuring the views among sections of the Jordanian population on the US-led occupation of Iraq.

On the next level, this is not the only occasion when the IAF has been at odds with the government. In recent years, the Islamists in Jordan have been at the forefront of opposition to the normalization of relations with Israel and have organized popular protests to that effect. Similarly, since 1999, the Islamists have been trying to protect the interests of the Palestinian militant group Hamas in Jordan.

Thirdly, supporting a perpetrator of terrorism is simply unacceptable for Jordan. Any tolerance towards such actions by members of parliament not only offers sanctity to terrorism but also undermines Jordan's ability and willingness to prevent a repetition of the triple bombing. Since its confrontation with the Palestinians in September 1970, Amman has been extremely wary of internal violence that would undermine not only the country's stability but also the survival of the kingdom.

Fourthly, unlike other Islamist movements in the Middle East, the IAF has established a modus vivendi with the palace and has flourished. However, by adopting a position vis-à-vis al-Zarqawi that is at odds not only with the palace but also with the wider Jordanian public, the Islamists have clearly tested the limits of tolerance.

Finally, the sentencing of the Islamist lawmakers has altered the ground rules. It would be safe to conclude that the IAF would not accept the onslaught easily. Any expulsion of the two convicted lawmakers from parliament could force the leadership to pullout of the parliament and plunge the country into a deep political crisis. Despite the period row between the two over domestic and foreign policy issues, the political participation of Islamists in enhances the credibility of the Hashemite Kingdom.

At the same time, however, as King Abdullah warned in no uncertain terms, the Islamists “have to redefine their relationship with us. They have been working in the grey area for the past decades.”

Thus, Sunday’s verdict could well be the beginning of a new equation between the Islamists and the palace.

P R Kumaraswamy teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Lebanon: Neutrality

Lebanese neutrality, the only way-out

No peace plan will work unless Lebanon's neutrality is secured despite actors using the country as a playground for their own campaigns.

Commentary for ISN Security Watch (08/08/06)

Any ceasefire in the Middle East will be fragile unless there are fundamental changes in the international policy towards Lebanon. It will also be temporary unless more than lip service is paid to the fact that compared to Israel, it will be much more difficult to reign in a non-state actor such as Hizbollah.

For over six decades, Lebanon has been a playground for various internal militia and external powers. The Maronite Christians, the dominant political force in the country, looked to Paris for political support. Partly to ensure the independence of Lebanon, France also moved close to Syria, its former mandate territory. As a result, since the June war of 1967, Paris has been the principal Western supporter of Syria.

It was the French abandonment of Syrian president Basher al-Assad that enabled Washington to push through anti-Syrian moves in the UN Security Council, such as Resolutions 1559 (seeking Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon) and 1680 (demanding for Syrian recognition of Lebanon). This French shift also enabled the US to move closer to Lebanon.

Syria has been the second player in Lebanon. Even sixty years after the latter was formed, the Syrian leadership has yet to come to terms with Lebanon's independence.

The outburst of civil war in 1975 enabled Syria to intervene militarily in Lebanon. Initially, the Syrian intervention was aimed at preventing Maronites and Sunni Muslims from slaughtering each other.

However, the Syrian presence gradually became a source of resentment, especially within the context of Syria's refusal to recognize Lebanon's independence. The savior soon became an occupier. It was the assassination of former anti-Syrian prime minister Rafik al-Hariri in February 2005 that precipitated a hasty Syrian withdrawal. Still, Syria maintains its influence and to some Lebanese, even covert presence.

Israel is another player in Lebanon. Except for a brief intervention during the 1948 war, Lebanon did not participate in the Arab-Israeli wars. However, the presence of various Palestinian militant groups and their Fedayeen guerrilla in the 1970s dragged Lebanon into a conflict with Israel. This eventually led to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the subsequent occupation of the country's south until the summer of 2000 when Israel unilaterally pulled out of Lebanon.

The prolonged quiet along the the Israeli-Syrian border was compensated by both countries using Lebanon as their battleground. Devoid of military or diplomatic options vis-à-vis Israel, Syria has used Hizbollah as an effective leverage against Israel.

Further complicating matters, Israel has used Lebanon as a dumping ground for scores of Palestinian deportees, including hundreds of Hamas militants who were dropped in the no-man's land north of Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon in December 1992.
Fourthly, since its foundation in the early 1980s, the Shi'ite Hizbollah has emerged as a powerful player in Lebanon. Its protracted and often lethal military attacks against Israeli forces and their Christian allies in southern Lebanon were primarily responsible for the eventual Israeli pullout. Its role as a hardened resistance force has endowed it with international recognition, regional admiration and wider following among Muslims, Shias and Sunnis alike.

Hizbollah has continued to pursue actions that are neither discussed with nor endorsed by the Lebanese government, including the recent incursion into Israel and the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers that effectively started the latest conflict.

Palestinians represent the fifth group of player-warriors in Lebanon. They came to Lebanon primarily as refugees after having been expelled by Jordan following the attempts by Palestinian militants to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy. Under a deal worked out by Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser hours before his death in September 1970, Lebanon agreed to host various Palestinian militant groups, including the Palestinian Liberation Organization, led by the late Yassir Arafat. These groups were granted the political space to operate and carry out attacks against Israel. This state-within-state arrangement however, sowed the seeds of a civil war that lasted for over 15 years.

Though much international attention on Resolution 1559 is focused on disarming Hizbollah, any implementation would also cover the Palestinian militants who control and operate most of the refugee camps in Lebanon.

Lebanon has thus, been turned into a dangerous playground for inter-group rivalry, inter-state conflict and private militias that pursue their own goals, violently and independently of the central authority.

Even a regional power would not be able to confront and contain these challenges, and the Lebanese army is symbolic at best and inadequate at worst.

Even a robust and interventionist UN force along the Israeli-Lebanese border could only be a temporary solution.

To restore peace, the international community, especially the UN Security Council would have to recognize, declare and guarantee Lebanese neutrality - a neutrality not only vis-à-vis its neighbors but also vis-à-vis the private militia within.

While ensuring Lebanese neutrality will not be any easy task, it would still be more effective than the periodic fighting over Lebanon that does nothing but leave human suffering in its wake, destroy the economy and empower one non-state actor over another until the cycle begins again.

Web Link:

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16491

India: Hezbollah

India sidesteps the thorny issue of Hezbollah


Exclusive to Asian Tribune, August 8, 2006

On 31 July the Lok Sabha passed an unanimous resolution expressing India’s sentiments and concerns vis-à-vis the ongoing violence in the Middle East. Reflecting the traditional Indian position towards the region, it expressed its concern over the violence and condemnation of Israel.

This 246-worded resolution, however, has diluted India’s earlier stand on the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. A day after the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers, which precipitated the current conflict, New Delhi was more categorical. Even though it was critical of Israel’s “excessive and disproportionate military retaliation” against the Lebanese infrastructure, it was equally critical of the Lebanese militants. Without explicitly naming Hezbollah, the official statement categorically declared: “India condemns the abduction of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006 by Lebanese militants and calls for their immediate release.”

It is undeniable that the conflict has brought about colossal human tragedy and destruction of infrastructure. The resolution pointed out the conflict has “resulted in the killing and suffering of large number of innocent civilians, including women and children, and caused widespread damage to civilian infrastructure.”

The Indian lawmakers however, pretended that these sufferings are confined only to Lebanon. By focusing exclusively on the Lebanese dimension of the problem, the resolution gives a wrong and misleading impression that the destruction and casualties are one-sided.

Since the conflict began, Hezbollah has been directly targeting residential areas and its leader Hassan Nasrallah has been periodically threatening to strike at Tel Aviv. Besides the Ministry of Defence, the greater Tel Aviv area does not have any target of military significance. The barrage of rockets from Lebanon had forced more than quarter of a million Israelis to leave their homes in the north and to seek refuge in the central and southern Israel.

The partisan nature of the resolution becomes exposed when the House “conveys the deepest condolences, sympathy and support of the people of India to the people of Lebanon at this difficult time.” This is a reminiscent of the past when the India did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. While sympathy for the people of Lebanon is legitimate, fair and honourable, the resolution makes it a zero-sum game.

In the long run such blatantly one-sided wording would severely undermine India’s role and influence in the Middle East. Any post-ceasefire peace agreement would require the support and understanding of all parties to the conflict. By adopting an explicitly anti-Israeli position the Lok Sabha has undermined India’s role in any UN peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon, especially if the unarmed UN observers were replaced or strengthened by a robust force.

Likewise, the Lok Sabha was not prepared to explicitly recognise and accept Israel’s concerns but rather preferred to settle for generalities. According the lawmakers, “lasting peace and security in the region” would have to take “into account the legitimate interests and grievances of all the parties concerned.” Was it too sensitive to mention Israel’s concerns explicitly? But why?

One could attribute a number of possible explanations for the shift in India’s position from the early days of the conflict and its anti-Israeli tenure of the Lok Sabha resolution. There is a gradual shift in the position of the Arab states vis-à-vis the crisis. Even states such as Saudi Arabia who earlier were critical of the ‘misadventure’ of the Hezbollah have modified their positions. Partly due to domestic public opinion in support of the Hezbollah and partly due to Israel’s massive retaliation, the mainstream Arab states find it difficult to condemn the Shia militants in Lebanon when that country is under siege. India’s shift is also a reflection of this trend.

Two, the government of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh survives on the outside support of the Left parties. Of late, these parties who are both part of the government and part of the opposition, have been wielding considerable influence on India’s foreign policy. Since the outbreak of the recent violence in the Middle East, the Left parties have renewed their anti-Israeli antics. While remaining silent on the Hezbollah angle, these parties have been demanding the government to immediately suspend all military deals with Israel.

As the fighting went into its second week, Communist Party of India (Marxist) General Secretary Prakash Karat demanded that India should work for the imposition of international sanctions against Israel. Within days as many as 86 MPs belonging to various parties made a similar demand. With the Indo-US nuclear deal coming under widespread criticisms from the Left and Right, Prime Minister Singh could not afford open a new front over Lebanon.

Three, as the fighting intensified a number many were critical Israel for its excessive use of force. For the Indian politicians it was politically correct to maintain a studied silence on the role of Hezbollah in the entire drama. Even the Bharatiya Janata Party known for its pro-Israeli views thought it prudent the follow the general consensus in the Lok Sabha.

Four, India has rarely appreciated the internal nuances of various countries in the Middle East, especially Lebanon. Used to the conventional binary portrayal of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is unfamiliar with the confessional and complex politics of Lebanon.

Furthermore, its traditional understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also coloured India’s views vis-à-vis Lebanon. For many in India there are not much difference between Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. Both are perceived as forces that are ‘resisting’ the Israel occupation. The larger problem of Hezbollah undermining the authority of the central government in Beirut and thereby the stability of Lebanon, is rarely understood in India. Many Indian intellectuals are ignorant of the Syrian non-recognition of Lebanese independence and sovereignty. Hence, Indian leaders are not an exception in not appreciating the nuances of Lebanon and the inherent differences between Hamas and Hezbollah. If India supports the former, the logic goes; it should also support the latter, because both are fighting Israel.

Above all, Indian leaders have rarely appreciated the dilemma faced by others in combating terrorism and other forms of political violence. The Israeli experience of fighting fire-with-fire may not be replicated in other parts of the world. Likewise, other states could not be expected to follow the Indian practice of negotiating with groups that kidnap its citizens (from the Rubaiya Sayeed episode in December 1989 to the Kandahar hijacking in December 1999) Such a strategy might work in India but there are no guarantees that it would be effective in other parts of the world.

Thus, when the violence eventually stops in the Middle East, Indian leaders and political parties would have to learn a think or two about the delicate art of diplomacy.

Web version

http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/1446

India: Iran

Will Mottaki have the answers?

Indian Express (New Delhi), Monday, July 17, 2006

New Delhi will be eager to know what the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who arrives this week, has to offer on the three major issues that, of late, are troubling the bilateral relations.

Since the Cold War ended, Indo-Iranian relations were on the upswing and enjoyed a rare foreign policy consensus in the country.

Both Congress and the BJP invested considerable political capital in promoting strong ties with Tehran. The high point trend was the hosting of President Mohammed Khatami as the chief guest of the 2003 Republic Day celebrations.

But lately, especially since the surprise victory of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad an year ago in the Iranian elections, a downhill movement has started.

From New Delhi’s point of view, three issues dominate and undermine the bilateral agenda.
First and foremost, India is apprehensive of Iranian nuclear ambitions. Agreed, the manner in which India expressed its concerns vis-a-vis this issue may be questionable and New Delhi could have handled its vote at the IAEA more tactfully. But given the A Q Khan connection, India would have opposed Iran even without the American angle. Furthermore, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, India is on the same side as China and Russia: a nuclear Iran is a threat to its long-term strategic interests.

Any peaceful and diplomatic resolution will require Iran’s ability and willingness to swiftly, unequivocally and decisively convince the international community, especially the IAEA, of its peaceful intentions.

While New Delhi does not see any military solution to the conflict, it also does not share Iranian penchant for dragging its feet.

Mottaki might also recognise that even though India does not command the kind of power and influence enjoyed by China and Russia, its intentions are more transparent that the other two.
The perceived sympathy of these countries towards Iran is nothing more than a leverage to secure better deals from Washington. If the price is right, neither will not hesitate to “abstain” from any crucial vote in the Security Council. Iran can’t ignore a harsh reality: like the US, both China and Russia are opposed to Iran going nuclear.

India might also use the recent meetings with other leaders from the middle-east, especially King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’s Emir al-Sabah, to get the point across to the Iranian visitor. Their concerns and apprehensions over the perceived Iranian hegemony is real and could not be wished away by political rhetoric.

Further, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran will not be able to cite the Indian nuclear tests as a precedent, even in private. India might tell Mottaki that in the event of a confrontation with the international community, Tehran will not be able to count on India’s support.

In 1991, Saddam Hussein underestimated the opinion of the international community over Kuwait and Iraq paid the price. Hopefully, Ahmadinejad wil look for a better example than Saddam to emulate.

Second, India will also be keen to resolve the issue of the tri-nation gas pipeline. Despite considerable American displeasure and pressure tactics, India has been committed to the idea of strengthening energy cooperation with Iran. Until such time as the pipeline becomes a financially feasible proposition, India is prepared to increase the quantity of gas imports from Iran.

At the same time, Mottaki might also realise that gas export is a two-way trade and India is not the only beneficiary. A broad picture of India’s energy diplomacy vis-a-vis countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Russia might indicate that Iran will also be a loser if the gas deal falls through. A detailed picture of the extent of Indian investment plans in other parts of the world might convince the visitor that Iran, though important, is not India’s only option. While it is legitimate for Iran to demand a higher price, India will not be dictated to. Not by Washington and not by Iran.

Third and most importantly, Iran has only one address in India: Government of India. While the country can benefit from India’s democratic polity and avenues, its ability to influence the official Indian policy has to stick to certain norms.

At the height of the domestic controversy over the IAEA vote, an impression was created that Iran was trying to influence the policy by befriending certain quarters that were critical of the Manmohan Singh government.

In the early 1990s, Iran sought to play up the Shia factor and there were suggestions of tacit Iranian involvement in the Kashmir upsurge. Now it is playing footsie with the Left, which has emerged as a bitter critic of the government over Iran’s nuclear puzzle.

Mottaki might be reminded that so long as India does not have similar avenues in his country, Iran might avoid getting embroiled in Indian domestic politics. Diplomacy is a two-way street!
In short, be it nuclear, gas or domestic politics, India will be waiting for some serious and convincing answers from Mottaki.

Web Link:

http://www.indianexpress.com/story/8644.html

India: Bangladesh

The Hasina visit and Bangladeshi elections

Exclusive to Asian Tribune June 29, 2006

‘Political pilgrimage!’ That is how a functionary of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) described the recent visit of former Prime Minister and leader of opposition Sheikh Hasina to India. He was also playing with Hasina’s visit to the shrine of Sufi Saint Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddhin Chishti at Ajmer, the other purpose of her visit.

If one were to take the claims of the Awami League seriously, Hasina came India primarily to receive ‘the prestigious’ Mother Teresa award conferred upon her by a little-known NGO based in Kolkata.

If people were mistaken that Hasina was indeed the incumbent Prime Minister of Bangladesh, they could not be faulted. India did not want to give any ‘wrong signal’ to the Bangladeshi government and hence usual the trappings diplomatic protocols were conspicuous by their absence.

There were however, substantial interactions between the visitor and a host of Indian leaders. Among others Hasina met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Congress President Sonia Gandhi, former Prime Ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee and I K Gujral and Leader of Opposition L K Advani. While Defense Minister Pranab Kumar Mukherjee hosted a private lunch in her honor, she also met junior Foreign Minister E Ahmad. During her brief stopover in Kolkata, she met former West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu and thanked him for his cooperation in the conclusion of the 1996 Ganges accord signed during her tenure.

Given the intensity with which Bangladeshi politicians conduct their affairs, Hasina could not avoid hammering on the failures of the BNP-led coalition and doubted whether the next general elections would be free and fair and then headed for home.

The contrast

As they say, timing is everything. Hasina’s visit came just over three months after the visit of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia to India and only a few months before the Jatiya Sangsad elections slated for early 2007.

Since coming to power in October 2001, Khaleda had traveled world over but avoided going to India. For long it was suggested that protocol demanded that it was the turn of the Indian Prime Minister to make a state visit to Dhaka before Bangladeshi Prime Minister could come to India. But when Khaleda finally decided to come to India, this protocol demand was not fulfilled.

The March visit of Khaleda was hastily arranged. Other than two unimportant agreements, it did not address any of the myriad of problems that plague the bilateral relations. The issue of Bangladeshi trade deficit figured only marginally. This lackluster trip some seasoned observers to ponder: why did she come? What was the need for India to roll out red-carpet welcome for an agendaless trip?

This is not true for Hasina. Whether in office or in opposition she had periodically visited India and courted its support, made all polite noises on sensitive issues and often used her trips to carry on her anti-Khaleda tirade.

For its part, India has been equally warm towards Hasina. Irrespective of the party in power, New Delhi had always showed a soft corner for Hasina. The historic ties with Hasina’s father Bangabandu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as well as the shared secular ethos of the Awami League and mainstream Indian leadership forged a bond between the two. Hence, Congress or BJP, the Indian leaders have been extremely warm towards Hasina and did not hide their preferences, if it came to that.

Furthermore, when she was attacked during an Awami rally in August 2005, Indian leaders made concerned inquiries which naturally irked the Khaleda government. Likewise the killing of former finance minister and senior Awami leader Shah AMS Kibria in January 2005 led to India’s refusal to attend the summit meeting of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) originally slated for the following month.

Indeed, the coziness that Hasina generates in India, often contributed to the anti-India sentiments of the BNP and its allies.

Hobson’s choice

It is undeniable that Hasina and the Awami are friendlier towards India than Khaleda and the BNP. Indian leaders have often found it easier work with the former and have often difficult to communicate with the latter and establish a modicum of relations. Nor was the Awami ever compelled to raise the anti-India antics during elections. Above all Awami and its leadership are seen as a moderate, liberal and culturally inclusive political force in Bangladesh. Unlike others, Awami has been in the forefront of defending the rights of the Hindu minorities and cultural pluralism.

These very same factors also work against the Awami. As the country is increasingly becoming intolerant and conservative, liberal space in Bangladesh is shrinking. Its proximity towards India makes the Awami an easier target for the BNP and its allies. Since the Hindu minorities are traditionally viewed as Awami supporters, there is no incentive of the BNP to speak for their rights and protect them from extremist violence.

There is however, a much larger dilemma. Even if Hasina were to return to power, most of the problems that confront the Indo-Bangladeshi relations will continue. The Awami has no answers to problems such as flow of illegal immigration into India, mounting trade deficit or suspected presence of Indian militants inside Bangladesh. As highlighted by the controversy over the supply of Bangladeshi gas, its pro-India image would be a liability for the Awami League and will prevent it from making even the minimum concessions that are needed for an agreement.

The issue is not being closer to India but being able to alleviate the Indian concerns. Hence, Awami victory per se in the 2007 elections will not ensure an improvement of Indo-Bangladeshi relations.

However, having hosted Khaleda and Hasina in quick succession, India perhaps might consider inviting leaders from the Jatiya Party as well as the Jama'at. This would complete the circle of its non-partisan attitude towards Bangladesh when that country is heading for an acrimonies election fever.

Web link

http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/821

India: UNSG Election

India's risky UN Gamble
Sun, 2006-06-18 03:46
P R Kumaraswamy - Exclusive to Asian Tribune
By deciding to field Shashi Tharoor as its official candidate for the post of Secretary-General, India has taken a risky, avoidable and potentially disastrous gamble at the UN. Official spin notwithstanding, the move implies that India has given up its aspiration for a seat in the UN Security Council. At least in the short run.

Many countries both in Asia and elsewhere world will warmly endorse the Indian position of rotation “under which the next Secretary-General of the UN should be from Asia.” Indeed veteran socialist leader U Thant of the then Burma, now Myanmar, was the last Asian to occupy that position until he was killed in a tragic accident in September 1961.

At the same time, many countries even within Asia will have serious reservations of New Delhi’s subtext that an Indian should be that candidate. If an Asian had not occupied that post for over four decades, it is equally true that no woman had ever occupied it since the founding of the UN more than 60 years ago.

Tharoor, currently Under Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information, hopes to follow the footsteps of Kofi Annan. As under Secretary-General under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Annan succeeded his boss. Since Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden took office in 1953, every Secretary-General secured a second term.

Boutros-Ghali was the only exception. Got carried away by the support he enjoyed among the Third World countries, he needlessly stepped on the American toes only to be denied re-election. Capitalizing on this situation, his deputy Annan of Ghana staged a spectacular backroom coup and got elected in 1996 and was re-elected five years later.

Indian mixed signals

By conventions, great powers, especially permanent members of the Security Council, have shied away from aspiring for the highest elected office in the world. Since the election of Trygve Lie of Norway in 1945, it has always gone to smaller, influential and often neutral countries. Over the years the UN and the office of Secretary-General has become highly politicized and proximity to a great power would only add further criticisms and impede the functioning the person holding that office.

In throwing its hat in the ring, India has created a host of problems for itself. This move comes against the backdrop of its on going campaign for a permanent seat in the Security Council. Its ambition for a seat at the high table is visible and at times too blatant and brazen. Seen in the context of earlier refusal by the great powers to aspire for this position, one can draw two conclusions.

Within hours after the Indian announcement Pakistan’s ambassador at the UN Munir Akram reminded the world: “It is a tradition that the permanent members of the UNSC or countries aspiring to be its permanent members do not field candidates for the post of the UN Secretary General.” Simple English? India has given up its Security Council aspirations, at least for now. As some have pointed out, Tharoor’s election could indeed be a liability for India’s leadership ambitions.

Alternatively one could accept the contention of the Indian spokesperson that its desire for Security Council membership and its candidacy for Secretary-General “are separate issues and it is incorrect to perceive India’s support for one as dilution of our commitment to the other.” In that case this would mean India is consciously breaking the tradition set by the great powers even before its entry into the elite club!

Lacking sub-regional consensus

Secondly, India belongs to Asia but India is not Asia. The Indian move thus comes against the background of a number of other Asian candidates who had expressed similar interests. Among others, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon, Thai Deputy Prime Minister Surakiat Sathirathai, veteran Sri Lankan diplomat Jayant Dhanapala and Singapore’s former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong are mentioned as possible candidates. If India is there, Pakistan won’t be far behind, especially for such a heavy-weight contest.Islamabad has already indicated its desire to field a candidate for the job.

In geographic terms it means candidates from major sub-regions of Asia namely, East Asia, South East Asia and South Asia. At present some have more than one candidate and need agree on a consensus choice who could then be the common candidate for Asia, should a context with other continents become inevitable.

If this proves difficult then there could be more than one candidate from Asia who could be presented to the outside world. To reach such a continental consensus, sub-regional consensus becomes essential. Given their common political understanding and worldview, countries of the South East Asia might agree more easily than South Asia.

Ideally the India should have worked quietly and announced a common candidate acceptable to all the countries of South Asia. Not only this did not happen, now there are two perhaps three candidates from the seven-member sub-region. It is also not clear whether India has consulted other potential candidates before announcing its decision. Most likely it did not.

High-risk gamble

By seeking a position thereto avoided by great powers, India is sending a wrong message to the smaller countries. Its leadership ambitions and this move do not synchronize and many would see it as a reflection of confused state Indian foreign policy.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly, on the “recommendation” of the Security Council. New Delhi should have taken a second look at the Boutros-Ghali episode. Despite the overwhelming support he enjoyed, his re-election ambitions were quashed because of the opposition from Washington. Even though he enjoyed the support of other great powers US President Bill Clinton squarely vetoed him. Even Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s pleading did not change the situation.

Right now it is not clear whether Tharoor’s candidacy was broached diplomatically with others or that India secured the support of the permanent members. So far the US is not prepared to disclose its views on any of the candidates, including Tharoor. It is safe to predict which way the east wind from China will blow. Electing an Indian to the Secretary-General would be seen as an international recognition of India not just of Tharoor, something Beijing would not like to bestow.
Therefore, the Chinese endorsement of Tharoor will not be that easy and Beijing would extract substantial concessions or quid pro quo from New Delhi on other areas. If a Pakistani is in the race for Secretary-General, there is no need for second guessing.

China’s long term interests lay in identifying, supporting and promoting candidates from small countries. This way it could present itself as their well wisher, champion and perhaps leader. With China’s veto power, it will not be easy for India to cross the initial hurdle and reach a contest stage.

Conclusion

It is a high-risk gamble that India should have avoided. India no longer enjoys the overwhelming support of the Third World or non-aligned movement. Hence, a contest, if it eventually comes to that would reveal the extent of India’s popularity and standing. These are unchartered waters.
On his own Tharoor is a well-respected, widely recognized and scholarly person who understands not only the nuances of high-profiled diplomacy but is also equally at home with the sufferings of the faceless, impoverished and illiterate millions who live in urban slums or rural landmasses far and wide.

Tharoor perhaps has better chance of winning the converted post by playing up his UN credentials and underplaying his Indian connections. The central issue is not his personal qualities or qualifications but his Indian tag. Most scholars would be unable to identify the nationality of current chief Annan. Tharoor will not have that anonymity or luxury. There lies the real problem.

P R Kumaraswamy, teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

India: Oil Diplomacy

India’s slippery oil diplomacy

Commentary for ISN Security Watch (14/06/06)

The most significant fallout from India’s galloping economic growth is its increasing dependency on imports to meet its hydro-carbon demands. Unlike China, it is yet to emerge as a major player in the global energy market. But three developments are bound to alter this situation for ever: India’s growing demands for hydrocarbon; its dwindling domestic supplies; and the increasing globalization of Indian oil companies. These will shape and influence how India views its energy security and guide its long-term desire of stable sources of energy supplies.

The petroleum bill constitutes the bulk of India’s total imports and accounts for most of its trade deficit with the Middle East and elsewhere. For example, last year India's trade deficit stood at about US$29 billion, while its oil bill alone was over US$34 billion. Economists have universally agreed that by 2020, nearly 80 per cent of India’s hydrocarbon needs would have to be met by imports.

In the 1990s, India imported large quantities of refined products but the entry of private sector into the market has drastically increased India’s refining capacity. As a result, since 2001, India has emerged a net exporter of petroleum products. This will further increase demands for oil and gas resources.

Even without the current high oil prices, securing stable supplies at affordable prices has been high on the Indian agenda. The economic reforms and the bourgeoning financial resources of the state-owned oil companies have led India to pursue an aggressive oil policy.

This policy operates at two levels. In the first place, India is slowly moving away from its erstwhile practice of spot purchases and short-term contracts. These measures were unavoidable in the past, but stable and assured sources of supplies are essential if India is to push forward its economic growth. Moreover, some of the massive petrochemical plants in the country could not depend upon such ad hoc arrangements.

One such successful arrangement was the supply of 7.5 million metric tonnes (mmt) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) annually from Qatar. Under this arrangement, the Gulf state agreed to supply India with LNG for 25 years, with the first shipment delivered in March 2004. A similar arrangement with Iran for the supply for five million metric tonnes of gas through pipelines has hit a few rough spots largely due to the ongoing tensions between the US and Iran over Tehran’s suspected nuclear ambitions.

The second strategy has been in the realm of upstream markets whereby Indian companies invest in the exploration, production, and export of oil and gas in foreign fields. During the past few years, Indian companies have been actively involved in a host of countries. The OVL, the export arms of the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Commission, alone plans to acquire overseas oil and gas equity of 20 million tonnes by 2010. The company is active in 14 countries and has acquired 23 projects. Among others, it is operating in Vietnam, Russia, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Myanmar, Australia, and the Ivory Coast and is exploring avenues in Algeria, Indonesia, Nepal, Iran, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. In January 2005, the Indian company Reliance secured exploration rights in Oman. The largest Indian activity is in the Sakhalin oil fields in the Russia, where India has invested a whopping US$ 1.7 billion.

Such a strategy underscores India's determination to aggressively pursue an energy security policy and to minimize if not escape from disruption or fluctuation of supplies due to conflicts, natural calamities, or other unforeseen developments.

This strategy, however, comes with a price tag. Because India is new to this highly charged and competitive market, it faces a number of difficulties.

Questionable markets

In some cases, India entered into the oil market in countries at the receiving end of international criticism and sometimes even isolation. Sudan is a classic example of one such country that has become a major market for Indian investment and exploration. India already has invested over US$700 million in the GNOP oil fields in Sudan, and is currently working on a major pipeline project there. But India's entry into Sudan coincided with the civil war there and the departure of Western oil companies.

The same is true of Burma (Myanmar). In addition to its reservations about the policies of the military junta, Indian nationalists have had close ties with the father of the country's imprisoned pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Its eagerness to explore Burma's energy potentials, as well as its desire to minimize Chinese influence there compelled India to sidestep the democracy issue.

India's problem with Bangladesh is somewhat different. Though geographically closer, gas supplies have been bogged down by periodic tensions and differences between the two. Despite its mounting trade deficit of over US$1 billion, Dhaka has been reluctant to contemplate gas exports to India, and the question has become a politically sensitive one in Bangladesh. As a result, bilateral differences over trade concessions prevented Dhaka from participating in the Indo-Burma gas pipeline, which would have benefited Bangladesh.

There are also cases in which Indian interests have come into direct conflict with the policies of the US. During much of the 1980s, Iraq not only supplied large quantities of oil but also provided political support to India on key issues such as disputed Kashmir. As such, Iraq could have been the ideal candidate for India’s oil diplomacy. But with the Kuwait crisis of 1990 and the subsequent UN sanctions, Iraq was rendered off limits to India. The post-Saddam Hussein political reality in Iraq is too fragile and unstable for India to consider any long-term investment in the oil sector. Similarly, the US-led oil embargo against Libya following the Lockerbie bombing affected Indian interests.

In recent years, Washington's policy vis-à-vis Iran over the nuclear question and its opposition to the construction of a pipeline between Iran and India via Pakistan practically stalled the estimated US$40 billion gas deal. In the end, India's desire for a civilian nuclear energy deal with Washington dictated.

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) passed by US Congress in 1995 explicitly called for sanctions against any oil major that made an “investment” of more than US$20 million in one year in Iran. While India has so far avoided any oil-related sanctions, it remains vulnerable to US pressures. A recent report for the Congress suggested that while the overall India-Iran gas deal “would not appear to constitute an ‘investment’ in Iran’s energy sector, as defined by ILSA,” it hinted that that construction of LNG pipeline would be problematic.

The proposed Iranian pipeline as well as the extension of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline to India also have security dimension. For long, Indian security establishments have expressed reservations about having its strategic energy supplies pass through Pakistani territory. Furthermore, in recent years, pipelines in the Pakistani province of Balochistan have often been sabotaged, thereby raising pipeline safety concerns.

Syria is another country where India is actively pursuing the oil exploration – a fact that pits New Delhi against Washington, which considers Damascus part of the "axis of evil". The same is true of the Indian interests in Venezuela, whose President Hugo Chavez portrays himself as the new crusader against US imperialism.

This energy drive has resulted in India evolving a mixed policy vis-à-vis China. At one level, geo-strategic realities compel New Delhi to seek friendlier ties with Beijing. Wherever possible it takes that extra step to ward off any impression that New Delhi has been working in tandem with Washington in containing Beijing. At the same time, however, their growing energy needs intensifies Sino-Indian competitions in third countries. Last year, India lost energy deals in Kazakhstan and Nigeria to Chinese oil companies. Indian officials cried foul when China eventually won the Kazak deal. Similarly, belated Indian interests and involvement in Burmese oil fields were partly spurred by its concerns over China and its strategic presence in that country.

At the same time, the Sino-Indian energy search is not always competitive. Wherever a country in question has controversial relations vis-à-vis Washington, China finds India to be a useful partner. Both are cooperating in the development of the Yadavaran oil fields in Iran, and under the preliminary agreement negotiated in October 2004, the state-owned Chinese oil giant SINOPEC would obtain a 51 per cent stake in Yadavaran, while the ONCG would get a 20 per cent stake. Likewise, Chinese and Indian state-owned oil companies have been collaborating in Sudan and Syria.

Macro energy picture bleak

The macro energy picture, however, is rather bleak, as India’s dependency on imports for its hydrocarbon needs would only increase as its economy grows. Indeed, domestic supplies account for just 30 per cent of India’s crude oil demands, and the government admits that “India’s oil import dependency is likely to grow beyond the current level of 70 per cent.”

The entry of India signals a departure from the past, and its oil companies are willing and able to actively pursue the overseas oil market, including exploration and production. At the same time, as new comers, they are yet to appreciate the competitive nature of the market or the high political cost involved in oil deals. Some of India’s foreign policy choices often impinge upon its energy requirements and vice versa. Oil diplomacy will thus be a slow but slippery learning curve for India.

Web link

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